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Abstract
A huge quantity of data is generated and stored every day. Preeminent exam-
ples are the 300 million photos that get uploaded daily to Facebook or the 156
million emails sent every minute. Furthermore, it is remarkable that almost 90%
of the data in the world has been generated in the last 2 years. This humongous
quantity of data is typically hosted in data centres located in different geo-
graphic areas, and must be promptly served upon request. Hence, a paramount
property for distributed storage systems is reliability, which can be guaranteed
in case of failed or unavailable hardware or lack of network connectivity at the
price of introducing redundancy in the system. To this aim, erasure coding
techniques optimizing the storage overhead/fault tolerance tradeoff have been
used in production systems for many years, even though they do not completely
suit distributed environments.
Only in the last decade, a number of advanced coding techniques tailored
to distributed storage systems have been developed. As an example, Microsoft
Azure deployed a local reconstruction code in 2012. System designers now
consider maintenance-oriented metrics other than fault tolerance and storage
overhead, specifically repair locality, repair bandwidth and disk I/O. As it is
not possible to optimize all of them at once, the optimal code depends on the
particular application.
This quest of good codes for distributed storage systems has led to a very
active research area in which this thesis can be framed. First, we examine the
different efficiency metrics as well as state-of-the-art codes addressing them.
We then focus on the study of how the repair locality, that is the number
of nodes involved in repair operations, affects the use of distributed storage
systems. Next, we investigate the problem of block placement in distributed
environments and its effect on systems valuable properties such as the fetch
latency. Finally, we study how to introduce data entanglement on top of well-
known coding schemes to enhance desirable features of the resulting system, i.e.,
anti-censorship and reliability.
Keywords: erasure coding, distributed storage system, fault tolerance, stor-
age overhead, repair locality, anti-censorship, reliability
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Résumé
Une énorme quantité de données est désormais générée et stockée : 300 millions
de photos sont téléchargées sur Facebook chaque jour et 156 courriels sont en-
voyés chaque minute. Par ailleurs, près de 90% des données dans le monde ont
été produites au cours de deux dernières années. Cette quantité colossale de
données est typiquement hébergée dans des centres de données situés en régions
géographiques différentes, et doit être servie promptement sur demande. Raison
pour laquelle une propriété fondamentale pour les systèmes de stockage répartis
est la fiabilité. Une fiabilité qui ne peut être garantie en cas de panne réseau
qu’en ajoutant de la redondance. Pour atteindre cet objectif, des techniques
telles que les codes d’effacement qui optimisent le compromis entre le coût de
stockage et la tolérance aux pannes ont été utilisées dans les systèmes en pro-
duction depuis de nombreuses années, bien qu’ils ne soient pas complètement
adaptés aux environnements répartis.
Seulement au cours de la dernière décennie, une multitude de techniques
avancées adaptées aux systèmes répartis ont été développées. À titre d’exemple,
Microsoft Azure déploie depuis 2012 un code avec des propriétés de recon-
struction locale. Les architectes systèmes prennent désormais en compte des
paramètres portant sur les coûts de maintenance en plus du coût de stockage et
de la tolérance aux pannes, tels que la localité ou les coûts en bande passante
et en lecture/écriture. Puisqu’il est impossible d’optimiser tout cela en même
temps, le code optimal dépend de l’application concernée.
Cette thèse s’inscrit dans ce domaine foisonnant de la recherche de codes op-
timaux dans les environnement répartis. D’abord, nous examinons différentes
métriques ainsi que les techniques de codage de pointe qui satisfont à ces
métriques. Ensuite, nous étudions comment la localité, c’est-à-dire le nombre
de nœuds impliqués dans les opérations de reconstruction, influe sur l’utilisation
de ressources. Par la suite, nous nous penchons sur le problème de la distribu-
tion des données et ses effets sur des propriétés critiques telles que la latence.
Enfin, nous examinons comment l’enchevêtrement des données au-dessus d’un
code d’effacement peut renforcer des propriétés du système comme la résistance
à la censure et la fiabilité.
Mots-clés: code d’effacement, système de stockage réparti, tolérance aux
pannes, coût de stockage, localité, résistance à la censure, fiabilité
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context
The amount of data generated in the world grows exponentially. The 90% of all
the data stored in 2017 was created starting from 2015 [1] and it is estimated
that by 2020 every person on the earth will produce 1.7MB of data per sec-
ond [2]. Indeed people create data by actively storing information, but also by
performing actions, such as Google searches, Facebook likes and sharing con-
tent. For example, I have downloaded the data that Google stores about me
at google.com/takeout (more than 7GB of data). Besides the pictures that
I upload on GooglePhotos and the documents saved in GoogleDrive, Google
collects information about places where I have been, things that I have searched
(and deleted), apps that I use, my YouTube history and also my advertisement
profile [3].
More data to be stored comes from Twitter and Facebook. The increasing
trend of their users in the last years is shown in Figure 1.1. Nowadays, about
335M users are active in posting 280-characters-bounded messages, for a total
of more than 500M tweets a day [4]. On Facebook the number of active users
is about 2.23 billion. In the beginning of 2012, when that number was around
1 billion, every 60 seconds there were: 510K posted comments, 293K status
updates, and 136K uploaded photos [5]. In August 2012, every day 300M photos
were uploaded and 500 TB of data stored [6].
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Figure 1.1: Millions of worldwide monthly active users from the first quarter of
2010 to the second quarter of 2018.
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Figure 1.2: Encoding. Data to be stored is split in two data blocks (blue and
yellow) which are stored into two different nodes. A third coded block (the green
one), obtained combining the first two, is stored in a separate storage node.
This huge amount of data that users outsource to the various platforms must
be protected against loss. The objective of this thesis is the design and analysis
of resource-efficient storage solutions to reliably store the data that users entrust
to large scale distributed storage systems.
1.2 Motivation and objective
A time-honoured mean for achieving reliable storage is the introduction of re-
dundancy. Data redundancy techniques range from storage-intensive data repli-
cation to erasure coding, methods for data protection that meet the need for
reduced storage requirements.
The process of adding redundancy to a data object to be stored is called
encoding, and illustrated in Figure 1.2. Generally, data to be stored is split
into chunks, which are combined with each other to produce parities, i.e., the
redundancy. In the example, we create one green redundant block combining
the yellow and blue data blocks, thus the scheme entails a 50% storage over-
head. The original data blocks plus the parities form the coded blocks, which
are typically stored in distinct storage nodes, to decrease the impact of node
failures on the availability of the data object. The particular way to combine
the data blocks into parities determines the amount of storage nodes that can
fail simultaneously without causing data loss.
The process of retrieving the data object from the corresponding coded
blocks is called decoding, and illustrated in Figure 1.3. When the data blocks are
stored into functioning storage nodes, we just need to fetch them as they consti-
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Figure 1.3: Decoding. To retrieve the data from the system two alive storage
nodes are sufficient. The lost (yellow) block is recomputed from (blue and green)
alive ones. The (yellow and blue) data blocks constitute the original data.
tute the original data object. In our example, this requires Node 1 and Node 2
to be functioning. On the other hand, we can use redundancy to restore lost
data blocks by reversing the encoding operation. In particular, in the example,
we can recover from any single failed node, but if two nodes fail simultaneously,
we lose the document. In Figure 1.3, first, we fetch the blue data block. Then,
we recover from the loss of the yellow data block by combining the alive blue
data block with the green parity block.
When a node fails, the storage system can identify the particular lost blocks
via its metadata. Metadata describes and summarizes basic information about
what is stored in the system, so that finding and working with particular in-
stances is easier. For example, in HDFS [9], a distributed file system having
master/slave architecture, the entire file system namespace, including the map-
ping of blocks to files and the file system properties, is placed in a file called
the FsImage. The FsImage is stored in the master’s local file system and itself
protected by maintaining multiple copies [10]. The metadata generated for a
HDFS file and a HDFS block is around 150 bytes. Thus, metadata replication is
reasonable as long as the quantity of small files (files whose size is significantly
smaller than the HDFS default block size of 64MB) is limited [11].
Storage systems must be able to verify the freshness of the data stored.
For example, as it is possible that a block fetched from a HDFS slave arrives
corrupted (because of faults in a storage device, network faults, or buggy soft-
ware), the HDFS client implements checksums on the contents of HDFS files [10].
When a client creates a HDFS file, it computes a checksum of each block of the
file and stores these checksums in a separate file in the same HDFS namespace.
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When a client retrieves file contents, it verifies that the data received from each
slave matches the checksum stored in the associated checksum file.
Thanks to the metadata and to the integrity checks, the value of a block
in a distributed storage system is either known or unknown, that is, it is not
possible that the value is wrong. This type of failure is called an erasure and can
be modelled by a channel that either transmits the symbol as it is or declares
an erasure. For example, the binary erasure channel (BEC) has input alphabetX = {0,1} and output alphabet Y = {0,1, e} and is parametrized by the erasure
probability 0 ≤ α < 1 so that upon input x ∈ X , the BECα outputs
BECα(x) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩x with probability 1 − αe with probability α . (1.1)
The capacity of the BEC is 1 − α [12], and this provides a condition on the
maximal rate at which reliable communication is possible. In turn, capacity
achieving codes are desirable as high code rates lead to low storage overhead.
The storage overhead is not the only parameter affecting the overall per-
formance of the erasure coding technique deployed in a storage system. When
nodes fail, the system tries to reconstruct lost blocks by exploiting the erasure
code. This process can involve different entities depending on the system archi-
tecture, for example a proxy in charge of coding operations and a replacement
node taking over the failed one. Regardless of the specific architecture, a num-
ber of nodes, holding fresh shares from the original data, must be contacted
and must, in turn, read and send through the network the blocks necessary for
reconstruction. The number of nodes contacted (repair locality), the amount of
data read (I/O) as well as the amount of bits sent thought the network (repair
bandwidth) should be minimized to achieve resource-efficient storage solutions.
1.3 Thesis summary
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we outline foun-
dations of coding theory. In Chapter 3, we introduce and discuss the Markov
model for reliability evaluation. We review the state-of-the-art of erasure coding
techniques for distributed storage systems in Chapter 4, before presenting our
contributions (in Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8), which we summarize as follows.
1.3.1 Locality in distributed storage systems
Distributed storage systems often use erasure coding techniques to provide re-
liability while decreasing the storage overhead required by replication. Due
to the drawbacks of standard MDS erasure correcting codes with respect to
maintenance-oriented metrics, numerous coding schemes recently proposed for
distributed storage systems target metrics such as repair locality and repair
bandwidth. Unfortunately, these schemes are not always practical, and for most
of them locality covers information data only. In Chapter 5 and [Pub2], we com-
pare three explicit linear codes for three types of locality: a Reed-Solomon code
for worst-case locality, a recently proposed pyramid code for information locality
and the Hamming code Ham, an optimal locally repairable code directly built
from its generator matrix for all-blocks locality. We also provide an efficient
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way for repairing Ham and show that for the same level of storage overhead
Ham provides faster encoding, faster repair and lower repair bandwidth than
the other two solutions while requiring less than fifty lines of code.
1.3.2 Block placement in distributed storage systems
Regardless of the specific coding techniques, which can be the Ham code pre-
sented in Chapter 5 as well as traditional Reed-Solomon codes, codeword blocks
must be spread across the system nodes to guarantee reliability without exac-
erbating the overall latency. So we move to the evaluation of block placement
strategies using a distributed tuple space as a practical usecase.
The tuple space abstraction provides an easy-to-use programming paradigm
for distributed applications. Intuitively, it behaves like a distributed shared
memory, where applications write and read entries (tuples). When deployed
over a wide area network, the tuple space needs to efficiently cope with faults
of links and nodes. Erasure coding techniques are increasingly popular to deal
with such catastrophic events, in particular due to their storage efficiency with
respect to replication. When a client writes a tuple into the system, this is
striped into k blocks and encoded into n > k blocks, so that any k out of the
n coded blocks are sufficient (and necessary) to reconstruct and read the tuple.
Chapter 6 and [Pub1] present several strategies to place those blocks across
the set of nodes of a wide area network, that all together form the tuple space.
We evaluate the performance tradeoffs of the proposed placement strategies
by means of simulations. Furthermore, we implement and test a distributed
tuple space supporting erasure coding and block placement.1 Our results reveal
important differences in the efficiency of the strategies, for example in terms
of the block fetching latency, and confirm that the knowledge of the network
topology is paramount to select the appropriate block placement strategy.
1.3.3 Random entanglement for anticensorship
The last two chapters of the thesis provides an analysis of system’s valuable
properties that can be enhanced using data entanglement on top of an erasure
code. In particular, we combine random data entanglement and MDS codes for
anti-censorship.
Users entrust an increasing amount of data to online cloud systems for
archival purposes. Existing storage systems designed to preserve user data
unaltered for decades do not, however, provide strong security guarantees—
at least at a reasonable cost. Chapter 7 and [Pub3] introduce Recast, an
anti-censorship data archival system based on random data entanglement. Doc-
uments are mixed together using an entanglement scheme that exploits erasure
codes for secure and tamper-proof long-term archival. Data is intertwined in
such a way that it becomes virtually impossible to delete a specific document
that has been stored long enough in the system, without also erasing a sub-
stantial fraction of the whole archive, which requires a very powerful adversary
and openly exposes the attack. We validate Recast’s entanglement approach
1The work has been done in collaboration with Vitaly Buravlev, who took care of the block-
placement-aware distributed tuple space prototype implementation. Notice, nevertheless, that
block placement heuristics and tuple space usecase are orthogonal. Indeed our block placement
heuristics can be applied to different usecases, the distributed tuple spaces being one of them.
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via simulations.2 In one of our settings, we show that Recast, configured with
the same storage overhead as triple replication, can withstand 10% of storage
node failures without any data loss. Furthermore, we estimate that the effort re-
quired from a powerful censor to delete a specific target document is two orders
of magnitude larger than for triple replication.
1.3.4 Structured entanglement for reliable storage
Opposite to Chapter 7, we remove the randomness from the data entanglement
process and use binary linear codes in Chapter 8 and [Pub4]. In particular,
we combine structured data entanglement and binary linear block codes for
reliability.
The combination of structured entanglement and linear block codes gives rise
to convolutional LDPC codes, which we study over the binary erasure channel
for immutable distributed storage. These codes allow the archival of data objects
in a sequential fashion on an increasing number of storage nodes as they arrive
in the system, as well as fast repair using a simple message passing decoder.
We further target systematic codes, high code rates and low locality, which
are paramount in this setting. We describe a family of codes that split each
archived data object in s blocks, entangle them with t = s + p blocks already
archived, and generate p parity blocks per archived data object. We carefully
choose the parity-check matrix and the blocks already archived to maximize
the repair capability of the resulting codes, and describe the best constructions
for 1 ≤ s ≤ 5 and p = 2. A Markov analysis3 shows that, for the same storage
overhead, our codes are orders of magnitude more reliable than state-of-the-art
Reed-Solomon and locally repairable codes.
2In [Pub3], besides validating the approach via simulations, we test Recast by means of
a full-fledged prototype, implemented and evaluated by Dorian Burihabwa.
3The reliability analysis takes advantage of the work done in collaboration with Laurent
Hayez to approximate the number of repairable failures.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Linear codes over finite fields
In this section, we summarize main facts about linear codes and we refer to [13,
14] for a complete introduction. We denote Fp the finite field with p elements,
for a prime p. The finite field is endowed with two operations, modular addition
and modular multiplication, that is, for a, b ∈ Fp we have (a+b mod p) ∈ Fp and(a ⋅ b mod p) ∈ Fp [15]. In what follows, we refer to the modular addition over
F2 as the XOR and we write ⊕. We denote Fpe the finite field with pe elements
for a prime p and a positive integer e and we refer to [15] for its definition.
A linear code C of length n and dimension k ≤ n over Fp is a k-dimensional
vector subspace of the vector space (Fp)n and we indicate it as C (k,n−k). The
elements of the code are codewords, and the n components of a codeword are
blocks. Two well-known matrices describe a linear code. The generator matrix G
maps a message of (Fp)k to its corresponding codeword
C = {m ⋅G ∶m ∈ (Fp)k}.
The parity-check matrix H has the property that GHt = 0 and can be used to
check whether or not a word x belongs to the code
x ∈ C ⇔H ⋅ xt = 0.
The code is systematic if messages can be found unchanged in the corresponding
codewords. Equivalently, a k ×n generator matrix is in systematic form when k
out of its n columns form the k × k identity matrix Ik.
Proposition 2.1. [14, Theorem 1.2.1] Let A be a k×(n−k) matrix. For a code
of length n and dimension k with generator matrix G = (Ik ∣ A) in systematic
form, the parity check matrix is H = (−At ∣ In−k).
The Hamming distance between two vectors is the number of coordinates in
which they differ. The Hamming weight ω(v) of a vector v is the number of
non-zero coordinates. Clearly, the Hamming distance between two vectors v,w
is the Hamming weight of the vector v −w.
The third important parameter of a linear code C , besides the length and
dimension, is the minimum distance d between its codewords
d = min
c∈C∖{0}ω(c)
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which can be computed from a parity-check matrix of the code as follows.
Proposition 2.2. [14, Corollary 1.4.14] A linear code has minimum distance d
if and only if its parity-check matrix has a set of d linearly independent columns
but no set of d − 1 linearly dependent columns.
Let ⌊x⌋ denote the greatest integer less than or equal to x. The minimum
distance expresses the correction capability of the code. Indeed, a code with
minimum distance d can correct ⌊d−1
2
⌋ errors. Erasures are failures occurring
at a known position so they do not need to be detected. Hence, a code with
minimum distance d can correct d − 1 erasures.
The Singleton bound is an upper bound on the minimum distance of a code
C (k,n − k), which for linear codes reads as
d ≤ n − k + 1. (2.1)
Codes reaching this bound with equality are called MDS codes (Maximum Dis-
tance Separable) and we write mds(k,n − k) for a MDS code of length n and
dimension k. Thus, MDS codes have the greatest minimum distance possible,
that is, fixed n and k (the storage overhead n−k
k
is also fixed), they maximize the
correction capability. We summarize this by saying that MDS codes optimize
the storage overhead/fault tolerance tradeoff.
A well-known family of MDS codes is Reed-Solomon (RS) codes [16]. Let
Fq ∖ {0} = {P1, . . . , Pn = Pq−1} and Fq[x] be the polynomial ring over Fq. Then
rs(k,n − k) = {(f(P1), . . . , f(Pn))) ∶ f ∈ Fq[x],deg(f) ≤ k − 1},
that is, rs(k,n−k) is obtained evaluating all polynomials with coefficients in Fq
of degree up to k−1 at all non-zero points of Fq [15]. Thus, its generator matrix
is
Grs(k,n − k) = ⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1 . . . 1
P1 P2 . . . Pn⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
P k−11 P k−12 . . . P k−1n
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (2.2)
In practice, Cauchy-based Reed-Solomon codes are the fastest in encoding
and decoding in their family. The theory behind these codes is presented in [17]
and the construction is based on Cauchy matrices. Indeed, Cauchy matrices can
be inverted significantly faster than arbitrary matrices, in time proportional to
n2 for a n × n matrix. More in detail, a Cauchy matrix is of the form
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
x1+y1 1x1+y2 . . . 1x1+yn
1
x2+y1 1x2+y2 . . . 1x2+yn⋱
1
xm+y1 1xm+y2 . . . 1xm+yn
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where xi + yj ≠ 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤m and 1 ≤ j ≤ n, all xi for 1 ≤ i ≤m are distinct,
and all yj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n are distinct. In particular, for an integer L > 1, we can
build a 2L−1 × 2L−1 Cauchy matrix over F2L by choosing, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2L−1:
1. xi ∈ F2L whose binary expansion is the binary expansion of i − 1,
2. yi ∈ F2L whose binary expansion is the binary expansion of 2L−1 + i − 1.
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A Cauchy matrix is non-singular and its sub-matrices are themselves Cauchy,
hence non-singular [17]. As a consequence, given C a (n−m)×m Cauchy matrix
over F2L , the matrix G = (Im ∣ C) is the generator matrix of a systematic MDS
code of dimension m and length n over F2L [17].
Unfortunately, finite field arithmetic highly penalizes the performance. Hence,
a method for writing Reed-Solomon codes based on Cauchy matrices as XOR-
based codes is presented in [17]. The basic idea of the XOR-based representation
is that elements of F2L can be represented as vectors of size L and matrices of
size L×L over F2. In particular, the vector representation of the sum α+β ∈ F2L
can be obtained adding the vector representations for α ∈ F2L and β ∈ F2L . Fur-
thermore, the matrix-vector multiplication yields the vector representation of
the product αβ ∈ F2L .
To obtain the matrix representation of f ∈ F2L , first, we write F2L = F2/(p(x))
where p(x) ∈ F2[x] is an irreducible polynomial of degree L. Then, we identify
an element f ∈ F2L with the polynomial f = L−1∑
i=0 fixi ∈ F2[x] and call coefficient
vector the column vector (f0, . . . , fL−1)t. The matrix representation of f ∈ F2L is
τ(f) = ⎛⎜⎝
⋮ ⋮ ⋮
f mod p(x) xf mod p(x) . . . xL−1f mod p(x)⋮ ⋮ ⋮
⎞⎟⎠ (2.3)
where the i-th column is the coefficient vector of xi−1f mod p(x).
Based on the vector and matrix representations for the elements of F2L , a
general method for turning a systematic, linear code over F2L into a systematic,
linear code over F2 is given in [17]. For a code of length n and dimension m, let
L ≥ max(log(m), log(n−m)). Let the messageM havem blocks each containing
L words of arbitrary size w, and replace each field element in the message over
F2L by its vector representation over F2. Let C˜ be a (n−m)×m Cauchy matrix
over F2L . Then consider C = (Im ∣ C˜) = (cij) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m
and replace each element in C by its matrix representation over F2 to obtain
the generator matrix G of the XOR-based code: G = (τ(cij)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. The j-th packet Ej of the encoding of M consists of the rows
rjL+1, . . . , r(j+1)L of the matrix G ⋅M .
The encoding of the XOR-code can be done using O(m(n−m)L2) XORs of
words of size w. The decoding of the XOR-code can be done using O(mkL2)
XORs of words of size w and O(k2) arithmetic operations in the field F2L ,
assuming that m − k information packets and k redundant packets are given.
An efficient implementation achieving the results from [17] is available at [18].
2.2 Binary LDPC codes
A low-density parity-check (LDPC) code is a block code that has a sparse parity-
check matrix [19, 20]. In this thesis, we consider binary LDPC codes only, that
is, LDPC codes having parity-check matrix over F2. LDPC codes are usually
represented with bipartite graphs, also called Tanner graphs. In the literature,
we find two distinct ways of expressing such a graph: the message/check node
method, e.g. [21], and the variable/check node method, e.g. [22]. While the
first method only applies to systematic LDPC codes, the second can describe
systematic and non-systematic LDPC codes. We present the two approaches
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Figure 2.1: Tanner graph representations for LDPC codes.
using a toy example. We consider the code of dimension k = 4 and length n = 7
defined by the following generator G and parity-check H matrices
G = ⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ , H =
⎛⎜⎝
1 0 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 1
⎞⎟⎠ .
2.2.1 Message/check node method
The bipartite graph B1 in Figure 2.1(a) has k left message nodes and n−k right
check nodes. Each left node represents a data block and each right node the
XOR of the left nodes connected to it. Hence, the code is in systematic form.
The matrix M(B1) corresponding to the message/check node graph is the
sub-matrix corresponding to the non-systematic part of G or H, that is
M(B1) = ⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1 0
0 1 1
1 1 1
1 0 1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
On the message/check node graph, to encode we simply compute parity bits as
prescribed by right nodes. We now describe one step of iterative decoding on
this graph. For example, suppose node L1 is erased. We check its neighbouring
right nodes (follow the orange dashed lines in Figure 2.1(a)) and we pick one,
say C, connected only to alive nodes (except for L1). Let us call A the set
of alive variable nodes connected to C (follow the blue dotted lines in Figure
2.1(a)). We compute L1 as the XOR of the selected neighbouring right node C
with the alive nodes in A. Iterative decoding proceeds in this fashion for all the
erased node. It stops when either all erased left nodes have been repaired or
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when for the remaining erased nodes it cannot find a right neighbour connected
only to alive nodes (except the one to repair).
2.2.2 Variable/check node method
In this thesis, we use the variable/check node representation in which left nodes
represent encoded blocks and right nodes are constraints over variable nodes,
that is, the XOR of the left nodes incident to a certain right node is 0. The
bipartite graph B2 in Figure 2.1(b) has n variable nodes and n−k check nodes.
The variable/check node graph corresponds to the parity-check matrix H of the
code; in particular, there is an edge from Lu to Rv if and only if hvu = 1 where
hvu is the element on row v and column u of H.
For encoding, from the graph B2 the k × n generator matrix G is generated
and then used to calculate the n encoded symbols held by variable nodes [23]. To
see how one step of the iterative decoding works, suppose node L1 is erased. We
check its neighbours right nodes, it has only R1. If all variable nodes adjacent
to R1 (except for L1) are alive, we can compute L1 as the XOR of those variable
nodes (follow the orange dashed line, then the blue dotted ones in Figure 2.1(b)).
We complete the discussion about iterative decoding on the variable/check node
graph in Section 2.2.4.
2.2.3 Degree distribution and stopping set
For LDPC codes we define the variable node degree distribution λ(x) = ∑λixi−1
and the check node degree distribution ρ(x) = ∑ρixi−1 where λi, ρi are the
fractions of edges of degree i on the left and on the right, respectively. The
average node degree on the left, denoted al, and on the right, denoted ar,
satisfy respectively a−1l = ∑i λii and a−1r = ∑i ρii [21].
We say that the LDPC code is left regular with left degree l if and only if
λl = 1 and λi = 0 for i ≠ l, that is, λ(x) = xl−1. We say that the LDPC is right
regular with right degree r if and only if ρr = 1 and ρi = 0 for i ≠ r, that is,
ρ(x) = xr−1. A (l, r)-regular LDPC code is both l-left and r-right regular.
In [24], the authors give a combinatorial characterization of decoding failures
and use it to develop a finite-length analysis of LDPC codes when used over the
binary erasure channel, see Section 4.5.3. In particular, they identify stopping
sets as the key object to evaluate the finite-length performance of LDPC codes.
A stopping set S is a subset of the n variable nodes such that all neighbours of
S are connected to S at least twice [24]. The stopping number σ is the length
of the smallest stopping set and it represents the minimum number of erasures
that cannot be corrected by message passing [22].
For a LDPC code of minimum distance d (i.e., the smallest Hamming weight
of non-zero codewords) it holds σ ≤ d [25]. For regular codes with left degree 2,
the stopping number is at most in O(logn), which follows from σ ≤ d and the
fact that the minimum distance d is in O(logn) for these codes [25]. Moreover,
if the variable nodes have degree 2 and the graph has girth g (length of the
shortest cycle), then the stopping number is σ = g
2
[26].
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2.2.4 Message passing on the BEC
We now complete the discussion on iterative decoding started in Section 2.2.2. In
message passing iterative decoding algorithms, messages are exchanged between
the variable and the check nodes in discrete time steps [27, 28, 29]. In a variable-
to-check message round, each variable node passes along its value {0,1, e} to
the neighbouring check nodes. In a check-to-variable message round, each check
node passes to a neighbour v either an erasure, if it receives an erasure from at
least one neighbour besides v, or the parity of the bits received from neighbours
other than v.
The algorithm above can be implemented so that each edge of the Tanner
graph is used exactly once; this version of the iterative decoder has been labelled
the peeling decoder [29]. Once the value of a variable node is known, it is sent
to neighbouring check nodes and the variable node and its incident edges are
removed from the graph. When a check node has degree 1, i.e., the values of its
neighbouring variable nodes are all known except one, it sends the parity value
to its remaining neighbour and both check node and the edge incident to it are
removed.
Message passing is not guaranteed to decode all message nodes and decoding
is successful provided that [21, 27]
ρ(1 − λ(x)) > 1 − x (2.4)
for all 0 < x ≤ 1, or equivalently provided that for all 0 < y ≤ 1
λ(1 − ρ(y)) < 1 − y. (2.5)
Notice that this condition does not assure the repair of all the missing left nodes;
it only guarantees continuation of the recovery process as long as the number of
edges in the induced subgraph is a constant fraction of the original number of
edges [27]. To prove that the decoding is successful, in addition, the left degree
is required to be different from 1 and 2 [27, Theorem 2].
The dual condition (2.5) can be used to compute the maximal fraction of
erasures that can be recovered using message passing. Indeed, such a value is
the supremum  satisfying (2.5) for all 0 < y ≤ 1, that is,  < 1−y
λ(1−ρ(y)) = f(y).
We compute the minimum e of the function f(y) as the unique root in (0,1]
of f ′(y) = 0. Then  < f(e) and f(e) gives the average percentage of erasures
that can be corrected by a LDPC code with distributions λ(x), ρ(x). We aim
at having capacity-achieving codes, i.e., codes with rate R such that 1 − R is
arbitrarily close to  from (2.5).
LDPC codes arising from regular graphs are not close to optimal. Indeed,
for a random bipartite regular graph with left degree l ≥ 3 and right degree l
β
the condition (2.4) holds only if  ≤ 4(1 − ( 1
1−l) 1lβ −1 ) [21]. Hence, the maximum
acceptable loss rate goes to 0 as l goes to ∞.
For l = 2, the maximum acceptable loss rate goes is 0 [29]. Using condition
(2.5), it is possible to prove that the performance of regular graphs deteriorates
as the left degree increases. Thus, the best performance is obtained when l = 3
[30], and to have positive rate for l = 3, it must be r ≥ 4 [29].
12
2.2.5 Complexity considerations
There is no polynomial time algorithm for computing the size of the smallest
stopping set of a Tanner graph unless P = NP [31]. Furthermore, in [32] it is
shown that the size of the smallest stopping set is also hard to approximate. For
any  > 0, a (1+ )-approximation algorithm (running in polynomial time in the
size of the input x) for a minimization problem P is an algorithm that for any
input x for P returns a feasible solution y such that the cost of y is bounded by(1+ ) times the cost of an optimal solution for the instance x. For the problem
of finding the size of the smallest stopping, there does not exist any polynomial
time (1+ )-approximation algorithm for any constant  > 0 unless P = NP [32].
These results are further improved in [33]: the authors show that the problem
of finding the smallest stopping set cannot be approximated within o(logN),
where N denotes the description length of the problem, unless P = NP. In
the same paper, the hardness of approximation results for LDPC codes (which
correspond to Tanner graphs with sparse parity-check matrix) is also proved.
In general, the fact that a problem is NP-hard does not imply that a special
instance of that problem is NP-hard. But for the stopping set problem, there
exists a constant α > 1 such that it is NP-hard to α-approximate the stopping
set of minimum cardinality in the Tanner graph of an LDPC code [33].
FTP (fixed-parameter tractable) is the class of parametrised problems that
allow for the existence of a polynomial time algorithm. The problem of finding
the stopping set of minimum cardinality is W[1]-hard (FPT = W[0] and W[0] ⊆
W[1]) [33]. It has complexity growing exponentially with the size of the smallest
stopping set, but only polynomially with the length of the code. This means
that one can find the smallest stopping of fairly long codes provided that the
size of the stopping set is small enough (10-15 [33]).
To overcome the intractability results, enumeration algorithms have been
developed. The algorithm in [34] can find an exhaustive list of stopping sets up
to size 13. An efficient way to find all the stopping sets smaller than a certain
threshold for a fixed LDPC code is proposed in [35] and further developed
in [36]. Integer programming is used in [37] to describe and calculate the smallest
stopping set size on the BEC, for a wide variety of practical code lengths of both
regular and irregular LDPC codes.
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Chapter 3
Reliability evaluation for
distributed storage systems
Erasure codes are a mean to make storage systems reliable. But how reliable?
Let us think about two Reed-Solomon codes, e.g., rs(k,n−k) and rs(2k,2n−2k),
with the same storage overhead but different levels of fragmentation. Do they
offer the same reliability? To answer such a question, that is, to be able to
compare different coding techniques with respect to the reliability they offer,
traditional reliability models were constructed with some simplifying assump-
tions: the only failures are whole-device failures, devices fail at a constant rate,
devices repair at a constant rate, and failures are independent [38]. With these
hypotheses computing the mean time to data loss (MTTDL) via Markov chain
is a relatively easy task.
Despite the fact of being not universally accepted, see Section 3.4, we use
Markov chains for reliability evaluation because they are easy to handle, widely
used, e.g. [39, 40, 41], and applicable to a wide variety of coding techniques
including MDS, LRC, XOR-based and LDPC codes.
3.1 Markov model for MDS codes
We present the Markov model to evaluate the MTTDL of a representative code-
word of a mds(k,n − k) code, which can withstand up to n − k erasures.
The representation of a Markov chain with 5 states is given in Figure 3.1.
In State 0 the codeword is intact and in the last state of the chain, the data loss
(DL) state, it cannot be repaired. The transition rates σi and µ between these
states are characterized by mean time to failure (mttf), or equivalently drive
failure rate λ = 1mttf , and mean time to repair (mttr), or equivalently drive repair
rate µ = 1mttr . We show common values for those parameters in state-of-the-art
0 휇 휇 휇
훔3훔2훔1훔0
1 2 3 DL
Figure 3.1: A Markov chain for a MDS code correcting up to 3 erasures.
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System N mttf mttr
HDFS-RAID [40] 3000 4 years 0.25 s
Windows Azure 400 not provided 30 min
Storage [41]
10-50 years (disks)
Google cells [39] 1000-7000 4.3 months (nodes) not provided
10.2 years (racks)
Table 3.1: Markov chain parameters for state-of-the-art systems. The number
of nodes N is not included in the Markov model.
systems in Table 3.1. The longer the mean time to failure, the more reliable the
system; the shorter the mean time to repair, the more reliable the system. The
states and the transition rates are the building blocks of the Markov model:
• The state of the chain is the number of erased blocks in the representative
codeword.
• The rate σi of the transition from State i to State i + 1 is
σi = (n − i)λpi (3.1)
where pi is the probability that the code can withstand one more node
failure, given that it has already tolerated i failures. We compute such a
conditional probability as
pi = r(i + 1)
r(i) (3.2)
where r(i) is the fraction of repairable failures of size i [42].
• The rate µ from State i + 1 to State i is determined by the recovery rate
of a single block as we assume that the recovery does not depend on the
total number of available chunks [39].
In general, the transition matrix [43] for the Markov model of a MDS code
correcting at most τ erasures is [42]
Pˆ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−σ0 σ0 0
µ −(µ + σ1) σ1 0⋱ ⋱ ⋱
µ −(µ + στ−1) στ−1 0
µ −(µ + στ) στ
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (3.3)
From the transition matrix Pˆ , to find the MTTDL, we compute the matrix P
which is the negative of Pˆ after removing the last column. Then
MTTDL(Pˆ ) = (1 0 . . . 0)P −1 (1 1 . . . 1)t (3.4)
which is the sum of the entries in the first row of P −1 and can be found by
solving for y1 the linear system
P (y1 y2 . . . yt)t = (1 1 . . . 1)t .
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Figure 3.2: A Markov chain for a MDS code correcting single erasures only.
The solution y1 of the linear system is the MTTDL of a representative stripe.
A storage system comprises many such stripes, and to compute the MTTDL of
the system we divide the MTTDL of a representative stripe by the number of
stripes in the system [42]. We now solve analytically Equation (3.4) for τ = 1,2,
that is, for codes correcting at most 1 and 2 erasures respectively.
Repair up to 1 erasure The Markov chain corresponding to a mds(n− 1,1)
code, n ≥ 2, is shown in Figure 3.2. The corresponding transition matrix is
Pˆ = (−σ0 σ0 0
µ −(µ + σ1) σ1)
and the MTTDL of a representative stripe is y1 such that Py = 1 where P is
the negative of matrix Pˆ deprived of the last column, i.e.,
(σ0 −σ0−µ µ + σ1)(y1y2) = (11) .
By Gaussian elimination, we get
y1 = 1
σ0
+ σ0 + µ
σ0σ1
.
Repair up to 2 erasures The Markov chain corresponding to a mds(n−2,2)
code, n ≥ 3, has 3 transient states plus the DL state and its transition matrix is
Pˆ = ⎛⎜⎝
−σ0 σ0 0 0
µ −(µ + σ1) σ1 0
0 µ −(µ + σ2) σ2
⎞⎟⎠ .
The MTTDL of a representative stripe is y1 such that Py = 1 where P is the
negative of matrix Pˆ deprived of the last column, i.e.,
⎛⎜⎝
σ0 −σ0 0−µ µ + σ1 −σ1
0 −µ µ + σ2
⎞⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎝
y1
y2
y3
⎞⎟⎠ =
⎛⎜⎝
1
1
1
⎞⎟⎠ .
By Gaussian elimination, we get
y1 = µ + σ2
µσ2
( µ
σ1
+ µ2
σ0σ1
+ 1) − 1
µ
+ 1
σ0
.
3.2 Model for non-MDS codes
Non-MDS codes are sometimes called irregular codes [38] to emphasize the fact
that their repair properties are not simply described by their minimum distance.
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Figure 3.3: A Markov chain for a non-MDS code correcting all single failures
and some failures of size 2 and 3.
Indeed, a non-MDS code C (k,n−k) with minimum distance d can withstand all
failures up to size d − 1 but also some of the i failures for i ≥ d. Thus, there are
some r(i) strictly greater than 0 and strictly smaller than 1, meaning that in
the Markov model there are arrows to the DL state not arising from the second
to last state.
An example of Markov model used to evaluate the reliability of a represen-
tative codeword for an irregular code of minimum distance d = 2 is given in
Figure 3.3. The difference from Figure 3.1 is the transition rate
δi = (n − i)λ(1 − pi) (3.5)
to go directly to DL from State i (for a MDS-code δi = 0 for every i ≤ n − k).
The transition matrix corresponding to the Markov chain in Figure 3.3 is
P = ⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
−σ0 σ0 0 0 0
µ −(µ + σ1 + δ1) σ1 0 δ1
0 µ −(µ + σ2 + δ2) σ2 δ2
0 0 µ −(µ + σ3) σ3
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
3.3 More accurate model for MDS codes
With the method presented in Section 3.1, the reliability of a single stripe is
extrapolated to large systems by dividing by the number of stripes. In [42] the
authors show that this is not exactly correct though it is a good approximation
in practice. Indeed, let us consider two codewords of a rs(2,2), which can correct
two erased blocks per codeword. With the standard method in Section 3.1, the
MTTDL of a representative stripe of length 4 is computed setting r(0) = r(1) =
r(2) = 1 and r(3) = r(4) = 0. Then, the MTTDL of the system is extrapolated
by dividing the stripe MTTDL by two, which is the number of stripes in the
system. However, rs(2,2) can correct up to four erased blocks if they are in
different codewords. In detail, two erased blocks are always repairable, r(3) =
48
56
, r(4) = 36
70
and five or more erased blocks lead to data loss. This suggests
0 0.8611 1 2 3 DL40.51
0.14
0.49
1
Figure 3.4: Markov chain for two rs(2,2)’s stripes.
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Figure 3.5: Does fragmentation improve reliability? We calculate the MTTDL
for rs(k,k) codes with k ∈ {2i ∶ 0 ≤ i ≤ 9} and mttf = {50, 365} days respectively
for the red and blue curves. We set mttr = 1 day.
that the MTTDL of the system is better than exactly half that for a single
stripe of length 4 and is correctly modelled by the Markov chain in Figure 3.4.
In the figure, we report the fraction r(i) of repairable failures of size 1 ≤ i ≤ 5
computed considering the two rs(2,2) stripes as a unique codeword of length 8.
Notice that such a Markov chain has a transition matrix of the form presented
in Section 3.2.
In general, to describe the Markov model that evaluates the reliability of a
system comprising S stripes of a rs(k,n − k) code as the reliability of a system
hosting a single codeword of length nS, we need to compute r(i) for n−k+1 ≤ i ≤(n− k)S. Indeed, all failures are repairable below the distance and (n− k)S + 1
erasures or more result in data loss, as there is at least a stripe with (n− k)+ 1
erasures that cannot be repaired.
3.4 Discussion
Markov chains are not universally accepted as a model for storage systems relia-
bility because of their hypotheses mismatching the real world. In this section, we
discuss the criticized unrealistic hypotheses and present a possible alternative.
3.4.1 Fragmentation
Under independent failures, fragmentation improves reliability [44]. More ex-
plicitly, increasing the dimension k (the fragmentation level) of the erasure code,
fixed the storage overhead, the reliability gets better. In term of Markov chains,
which do assume independent failures, fixed the storage overhead, the higher
the fragmentation level is ( k
n
, 2k
2n
, 3k
3n
, . . . ), the longer the MTTDL.
Nevertheless, in our computation, we only observe such a behaviour up to a
certain threshold. Indeed, in Figure 3.5, we see that a rs(8,8) code has better
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Trace Duration (days) Mean # up nodes f (per day) a
PlanetLab 527 303 0.017 0.97
Microsoft PCs 35 41970 0.038 0.91
Skype 25 710 0.12 0.65
Gnutella 2.5 1846 0.30 0.38
Table 3.2: Availability traces: estimates for a and f from [46] where a is the
probability that a node is available and f is the fraction of nodes that fail
permanently per time unit.
reliability than a rs(1,1) code as expected, but for k ≥ 128 the reliability of the
system gets worse. In particular, we compare systems of the same size, i.e., we
consider 512 codewords of length 2, 256 codewords of length 4, 128 codewords
of length 8, and so on up to 2 codewords of length 512 and 1 codeword of length
1024. We numerically compute the MTTDL of a representative stripe, then
divide by the number of codewords in the system to get the MTTDL of the
system, see Section 3.1.
The drop observed in Figure 3.5 is in contradiction with the idea that frag-
mentation always improves reliability under the assumption of independent fail-
ures [44]. When mttr and mttf differ by several orders of magnitude (as for
example in [40]), the drop comes when the dimension of the code is extremely
large. Indeed, to show the drop in correspondence of dimension 32 we use mttf
= 50 and mttr = 1. It remains an open problem to determine whether the
mismatch more fragmentation/higher reliability is due to some unrealistic as-
sumption of the model or the model well reflects the fact that fragmentation
can improve reliability only up to a certain threshold.
3.4.2 Independence of failures
A model that captures the average bandwidth used to maintain a file in the
system and the resulting average availability of the file is proposed in [45] and
exploited in [46]. The model has two main parameters: f is the expected fraction
of nodes permanently failing per time unit and a is the probability that a node
is available (1−a is the probability for a node to experience a transient failure).
Values for f and a are estimated in [46] based on traces of several distributed
systems and shown in Table 3.2. The model assumes that a node is available
independently of the availability of other nodes.
Such independence assumption is empirically verified on the Overnet sharing
network in [47]. In order to characterize the dependence between every host
pair, the authors of [47] calculate the conditional probability P (Y ∣ X) of host
Y being available given that host X is available from the empirical data for
every host pair (X,Y ). If this value is equal to the probability P (Y ) that host
Y is available then the availabilities of X and Y are independent. The finding
is that more than 30% of the host pairs (X,Y ) have P (Y ∣ X) = P (Y ) and
that for 80% of them ∣P (Y ∣ X) − P (Y )∣ ≤ 0.2, thus a significant independence
between host pairs is verified.
Nevertheless, this independence hypothesis is not universally accepted, thus
traditional Markov chain models are rejected as valuable instruments for esti-
mating reliability, e.g. in [48], because the assumptions that make the model
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easy do not match modern systems. Independence of failures implies exponen-
tial distribution of failures. But both failure and repair distribution are better
fitted by the Weibull distribution [48].
3.4.3 Memorylessness
Memorylessness of Markov chains makes the model forget about progress. For
example, after a disk repair the component is treated as it is brand new.
3.4.4 Beyond Markov chains
As incorporating time-dependent properties in an analytical model is hard and
simulations can better capture them, a simulation based approach for measuring
reliability is proposed in [48]. In particular, the HFRS simulator [49] is a Python
tool for reliability analysis, based on Monte Carlo discrete event simulation. The
tool simulates disk failures, disk recovery, sector failures and scrubbing, and spits
out a reliability estimate, given the device failure and repair distributions, in
terms of probability of data survival (or loss) for a certain system lifetime.
There are two versions of the HFRS [38]. Because of the presence of library
npmath for random number generation, we believe we benefit from v.2, whose
output is the probability of data loss for a specified mission time. The HFRS
simulator can be used to evaluate the reliability of MDS codes as well as binary
codes with irregular fault tolerance, i.e., flat and array XOR codes. For MDS
codes, it is sufficient to input the dimension of the code, the number of parity
blocks, the minimum distance d and the minimum number of device failures
that leads to data loss (d as well in this case). For XOR-based codes, the
description must also include the Tanner graph, the minimal erasure list and
the fault tolerance vector. The left/right vertices in the Tanner graph represent
data/parity symbols respectively and an edge between left and right vertices
represents membership in a parity equation. To define the minimal erasure list
and the fault tolerance vector we need a bit of vocabulary from [50].
An erasure pattern is a set of erased symbols that results in at least one data
symbol being unrecoverable. A minimal erasure (pattern) is an erasure pattern
in which every erased block is sufficient and necessary for it to be an erasure
pattern. Every block is necessary as knowing any block of a minimal erasure
allows the recovery of all the other. The blocks are sufficient to form the minimal
erasure as having an extra erased block b allows the recovery of b only. Then,
the minimal erasure list (MEL) is the list of the code’s minimal erasures. The
erasure list (EL) is the list of the code’s erasure patterns: its elements are either
minimal erasures or supersets of minimal erasures and hence MEL ⊆ EL. The
erasure vector (EV) counts the number of erasure patterns: EVi is the number
of erasure patterns of size i in the EL. The fault tolerance vector (FTV) gives
the probability that a certain number of failures cause data loss, i.e.,
FTVi = EVi(n
i
) . (3.6)
MEL and FTV corresponds to two different modes of operation of the HFRS
for determining whether a specific set of failures leads to data loss: the former
corresponds to the highest fidelity while the latter can be used for coarser-
grained analysis [50].
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Parameters of the simulator are the sector failure model, specified by the
total number of sectors and the sector failure probability and the component
failure and repair distributions, specified by the shape, scale and location pa-
rameters of the Weibull distribution. We call κ > 0 the shape parameter and
λ > 0 the scale parameter of the Weibull distribution. When the independent
variable of the Weibull distribution represents the time-to-failure, the shape
parameter κ can be interpreted as follows:
• k < 1 indicates that the failure rate decreases over time. This happens if
there is significant infant mortality, or defective items failing early. The
failure rate decreases over time as the defective items are weeded out of
the population.
• k = 1 indicates that the failure rate is constant over time. The Weibull
distribution reduces to an exponential distribution.
• k > 1 indicates that the failure rate increases over time. This can be caused
by an ageing process, or parts that are more likely to fail as time goes on.
Despite taking into consideration realistic hypotheses, the HFRS simulator can-
not deal with non-binary irregular codes (e.g., LRC codes in Section 4.3) and
non-binary vector codes (e.g., regenerating codes in Section 4.4), reducing the
spectrum of state-of-the-art codes that can be evaluated and compared.
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Chapter 4
State-of-the-art codes for
distributed storage systems
Reliability can be ensured by the introduction of redundancy, the simplest
form being replication. As a generalization of replication, erasure coding of-
fers better storage efficiency. In particular, MDS codes offer the best fault
tolerance/storage overhead tradeoff. However, MDS codes are suboptimal in
distributed environments because the same amount of blocks is used for re-
construction regardless of the need to reconstruct a single block or the whole
document. This shortcoming is particularly evident in distributed storage sys-
tems because of the repair problem [40]: when a single node fails, one block is
lost from each stripe stored on that node. MDS codes are suited to recover from
the loss of many blocks in a stripe, not really for recovering single failures in
many stripes. In the latter case, they entail an avoidable network burden, as the
number of nodes contacted and the amount of data moved through the network
are suboptimal. We dedicate the first part of this section to erasure codes tai-
lored to the repair problem. In particular, we give further details on the repair
operation in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we introduce the repair cost metrics
that motivate the study of novel erasure coding schemes, which we review in
Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
In Section 4.5, we overview few, still uncommon, works on LDPC codes tar-
geting storage applications. Finite-length analysis as well as the study of small
LDPC codes slowly rise [23, 24], even though this family of codes has tradition-
ally been studied asymptotically, i.e., when the code length tends to infinity.
This hypothesis is unrealistic for storage systems. Finally, in Section 4.6, we
present data entanglement, which can be used to enhance desirable properties of
distributed storage systems such as anti-censorship (Chapter 7) and reliability
(Chapter 8).
4.1 Repair operation
Due to the frequent temporary and permanent failures that occur in distributed
storage systems, blocks may be unavailable [51]. Repair operations replace these
blocks in order to maintain the desired level of reliability. Regardless of the
particular method which depends on the coding techniques, repair operations
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are executed as a background job. Opposite, degraded reads serve requests for
currently unavailable data, by reconstructing it on-the-fly. Notice that a repair
operation often reconstructs a block per codeword, while a degraded read has
the purpose of serving the whole data object to the user.
Repair operations fall in one of two categories: exact or functional repair.
With functional repair, a failed node is replaced by a node that is functionally
equivalent, that is, a specific property, depending on the particular scheme, is
maintained by the repaired system, see for example [52, 53]. In contrast, the
problem of recovering the failed node exactly, by restoring the exact same blocks
as they were on the failed node, is known as exact repair [54]. There is no change
in the coefficients of a replaced node under exact-repair, which greatly simplifies
the implementation and avoids communication overheads during the repair [52].
Furthermore, exact repair is mandatory for systematic codes [55].
4.2 Metrics
Distributed storage systems attempt to provide two types of reliability: avail-
ability and durability [46]. A data object is available when it can be recon-
structed from the data stored on currently available nodes. The durability of
a data object is maintained if it has not been lost due to permanent node fail-
ures, that is, it may be available at some point in the future. Important coding
metrics that concur in determining a reliable system are:
1. Fault tolerance, i.e., the number of node failures that can be tolerated by
the system without data loss;
2. Storage overhead, i.e., the ratio of the storage space dedicated to the re-
dundancy over the total storage space;
3. Speed of encoding and decoding.
The higher the storage overhead and the fault tolerance the more reliable the
system. But while a high fault tolerance is desirable, a high storage overhead
is not. This leads to choose coding techniques with length n and dimension k
such that:
• n − k is small compared to k, typically n−k
k
< 1;
• the minimum distance d is as close as possible to the Singleton bound,
that is, to n − k + 1 for linear codes.
This motivates the traditional choice of Reed-Solomon codes, that can be built
for any k and n and reach the Singleton bound with equality.
Regarding the speed of encoding and decoding, in their fastest instance
rs(k,n−k) codes can be encoded and decoded in quadratic time with respect to
k, see Section 2.1. More precisely, algorithms for encoding and decoding Reed-
Solomon codes in time O(n log2 n log logn) are known, but for small values of
n, quadratic time algorithms are faster than the theoretically, asymptotically
fast algorithms [27].
When coding is used on a distributed storage system, if a node fails, in order
to maintain the same level of reliability, the system needs to re-create encoded
information at a replacement node. The consideration of the repair network
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MDS [16] 2.1 n k n − k k 3 7 7 1960
LRC [56] 4.3.1 n(r + 1) kr n − k r 3 7 7 2014
LRC [57] 4.3.2 n + τ − 1 k n − k ka 3 7 7 2013
LRC [40] 4.3.3 16 10 4 5 3 7 7 2013
LRC [41] 4.3.4 10 6 3 3 3 7 7 2012
LRC [58] 4.3.5 n k n − k − ⌈ k
r
⌉ + 1 r 7b 7 7 2014
LRC [59] 4.3.6 n k n − k − ⌈ k
r
⌉ + 1 rc 7d 7 7 2016
MBR [55] 4.4.2 n k [k,n − 1] 3 3 7 2011
MSR [51] 4.4.3 n k [2k − 2, n − 1] 3 3 7 2015
MSR [60] 4.4.4 k + 2 k 2 k + 1 3 3 3 2016
aA more general construction exists, which anyway improves information locality only. For
simplicity, we divide the k data blocks into τ groups with τ ∣ k, create 1 redundant block per
group and leave unchanged n − k − 1 global parities. Then, the information locality is k
τ
.
bThe authors offer a systematic version of the LRC code, for which the optimality of the
minimum distance is generally not guaranteed.
cIt must be r + 1 ∣ n.
dThe generator matrix described in [59] is not in systematic form. Nevertheless, the authors
describe a method to make it systematic, by preserving the locality and distance properties.
Table 4.1: State-of-the-art codes summary.
traffic gives rise to new design challenges [53]. Thus, besides the traditional
metrics, three major repair cost metrics have been identified in [56]:
4. Disk I/O, i.e., the number of bits read during the repair;
5. Repair bandwidth, i.e, the number of bits communicated in the network
during the repair;
6. Repair locality, i.e., the number of nodes that participate in the repair
process.
We now describe these new metrics in more detail.
4.2.1 Disk I/O
The disk read overhead during a repair using a Reed-Solomon code of dimension
k is k times that under replication. Indeed, to reconstruct a single block of size
b, k blocks of size b are read from the nodes participating to the repair [51].
Consequently, under RS codes, repair requires a large amount of disk I/O, rising
the need for lighter techniques.
4.2.2 Repair bandwidth
When a node fails, storage systems must set up a replacement node using in-
formation from the functioning nodes. Hence, a key question is how to restore
the information in the replacement node while transferring as little data as pos-
sible across the network. If a rs(k,n − k) code is used, for every block on the
failed node, k blocks must be downloaded from surviving ones and combined by
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the replacement node to reconstruct the lost coded block. Downloading a full
block from each of k surviving nodes is suboptimal [46]. Indeed, data recon-
struction can be performed by downloading functions of the data stored in the
surviving nodes.
To redeem Reed-Solomon codes, we cite a very recent work by Guruswami,
showing that RS codes can also take advantage of the freedom to download
partial symbols for the exact repair problem. The exact repair problem for high-
rate rs(k,n − k) codes can be solved with repair bandwidth of O(n) bits [54].
4.2.3 Repair locality
Repair locality deals with the repair of single node failures, i.e., with the recon-
struction of a single erased block in a codeword [40]. The repair locality of a
code is the maximum over the blocks locality [61]. The block locality of a block
b is the smallest integer r such that b is a linear combination of exactly r other
blocks. In other words, the block is said to have locality r if it can be recovered
by accessing at most r other blocks [61]. The block locality, and thus the repair
locality, ranges from 1, if the block is replicated, to k as this is the number of
source blocks. For repair efficiency, the lower the better.
A code with repair locality r has at least one block having block locality
exactly r and every block is a linear combination of at most r other blocks. When
it is clear from the context, we shall write locality for both block locality and
repair locality. If we deal with the locality of the code we refer to repair locality,
while block locality refers to the locality of a block of a representative codeword.
Locality can be weakened to protect only data blocks: the information locality
of a code is the maximum over all the data block localities. Moreover, we refer to
a code offering the same block locality r for every block as a code with all-blocks
locality r. For example, MDS codes of dimension k have all-blocks locality k,
which is the highest, thus the worst, possible.
We now give operational definitions of block locality. Let g1, . . . , gn be the
columns of a generator matrix G for a certain code. We say that the block
in coordinate 1 ≤ i ≤ n has locality r, if the column gi can be written as linear
combination of r other columns of G (and not less than r). Equivalently, for any
coordinate 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there exists a row in the parity-check matrix of the code
of Hamming weight at most r + 1, whose support includes i [62]. The definition
of code locality can be relaxed as in [56] to include both linear and non-linear
codes and to allow the size of the input and output blocks to be different.
4.3 Codes for repair locality
Codes that aim at as-small-as-possible repair locality go by the name of lo-
cally repairable [56], locally reconstructible [41], locally recoverable [58] and
self-repairing codes [63]. In the following we summarize what they are, what
they target and some state-of-the-art constructions.
A locally repairable code (LRC) of length n, dimension k and locality r can
recover any coded symbol by accessing and processing at most r symbols [59].
The LRC is optimal if it reaches the bound [61]
d ≤ n − k − ⌈k
r
⌉ + 2. (4.1)
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Optimal LRCs exist when r + 1 ∣ n [56].
A structure theorem for optimal codes when r ∣ k is given in [61], but explicit
codes are constructed only in the case d = 4. In the following, we review explicit
constructions of codes targeting low repair locality and offering a wide spectrum
of parameters.
4.3.1 Locally repairable codes
A locally repairable code of length n, (all-symbols) locality r, minimum distance
d, data object size M and size of the encoded symbols α is defined in [56] as a
code that encodes the data object of size M bits in n coded symbols of size α
bits such that:
• Any of these n coded symbols can be reconstructed by accessing and pro-
cessing at most r other symbols;
• The data object of size M can be reconstructed by accessing any n− d+ 1
of the n coded symbols.
On top of a MDS code of length n and dimension k, we can build an optimal
locally repairable code (LRC) of all-symbols locality r as follows [56]. We divide
a data object X of sizeM = rk symbols in r parts X = [x1, . . . , xr], with each xi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ r having size k. We encode each of the r chunks independently, into
coded vectors yi = xiG of length n, using the MDS code. Finally, we generate
a single parity XOR vector from all the coded vectors: s = r⊕
i=1 yi. The total(r + 1)n blocks are placed in n nodes, r + 1 blocks per node, in circular fashion,
requiring storage capacity α = r+1
r
M
k
= r+1 [56]. The code retains the minimum
distance d = n − k + 1 of the MDS code, but has rate r
r+1 kn . When r + 1 ∤ k, its
minimum distance meets the optimal bound (4.1).
4.3.2 Pyramid codes
We recall the construction for basic pyramid codes introduced in [57]. Pyramid
codes are built on top of an embedded MDS code in systematic form and retain
the distance of the inner MDS code, thus they are not MDS. Nevertheless,
they offer better information locality than a MDS code with same length and
dimension.
Let ei be the vector having 1 in coordinate i and 0 elsewhere. Let
G = (e1 . . . ek gk+1 gk+2 . . . gn)
be the generator matrix of a systematic MDS code. To build the pyramid
code, one of the parity blocks of the MDS code is substituted with τ blocks.
For example, we substitute the first MDS parity with τ blocks. First, the set{1, . . . , k} is partitioned into τ disjoint subsets S1, . . . , Sτ . Then, the following
blocks ( ∑
i∈S1 gi,k+1xi, ∑i∈S2 gi,k+1xi, . . . , ∑i∈Sτ gi,k+1xi)
are put in place of the first parity block of the MDS code. Hence, a generator
matrix for the pyramid code reads as(e1 . . . ek gk+1∣S1 . . . gk+1∣Sτ gk+2 . . . gn)
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which implies that the code has length n − 1 + τ , retains the minimum distance
of the MDS code and has information locality r = max
1≤i≤τ ∣Si∣.
4.3.3 Xorbas-LRC
The authors of [40] prove that a locally repairable code of length n, dimension k,
logarithmic block locality r = log k and distance dLRC = n − (1 + δ)k + 1 exists,
where δ = 1
log(k) − 1k . Hence, any subset of k(1 + δ) blocks can be used to
reconstruct the original data object.
An explicit construction, xorbas(10,6), implemented in HDFS-Xorbas, is
given for k = 10, n = 16 and r = 5 [40]. The xorbas(10,6) code has four parity
blocks constructed with a standard rs(10,4) code and 2 local parities providing
efficient repair in the case of single block failure. The authors show that the
code is optimal, i.e., it has the largest possible minimum distance d = 5 for
given locality r = 5 and length n = 16. Although the code is not in systematic
form, the authors of [40] provide a linear transformation that renders the code
systematic, while retaining its distance and locality properties. With a Markov
chain based analysis, see Section 3, the authors show that, in terms of reliability,
the higher repair speed of xorbas(10,6) with respect to rs(10,4) compensates
for the additional storage overhead [40].
4.3.4 Local reconstruction codes
With the goal of reducing the reconstruction cost, Local Reconstruction Codes
are proposed in [41]. In particular, k data fragments are divided into l groups
and a local parity is computed for each group. In addition p global parities are
computed for a total length n = k + l + p. For a linear code of length n and
dimension k to:
• Repair a single erased block using k
l
other blocks;
• Repair up to arbitrary p + 1 erased block;
it is necessary that n − k ≥ l + p [41, Theorem 1]. The l coding equations,
that is the equations that dictate how the parities are computed from the data
blocks, are determined so that the LRC achieves the Maximally Recoverable
(MR) property (the code does decode any failure pattern which is information-
theoretically decodable [57]).
In Windows Azure Storage, the was(6,4) code is used, which takes in input 6
data blocks and divides them in two groups. We call x0, x1, x2 the data blocks of
the first group and y0, y1, y2 the data blocks of the second group. The was(6,4)
code sets 2 local parities px, py and 2 global parities p0, p1, according to the
coding equations
px = x0 + x1 + x2
py = y0 + y1 + y2
p0 = α0x0 + α1x1 + α2x2 + β0y0 + β1y1 + β2y2
p1 = α20x0 + α21x1 + α22x2 + β20y0 + β21y1 + β22y2
with αi, βs ≠ 0, αi ≠ βs and αi + αj ≠ βs + βt. The was(6,4) code repairs any 3
failures and also 86% of 4 failures, achieving the MR property. With a Markov
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chain based analysis, the authors show that was(6,4) is more reliable than a
rs(6,3), which is in turn more reliable than 3-replication [57].
4.3.5 Tamo and Barg optimal locally recoverable codes
We describe Tamo and Barg construction for a LRC code of length n, dimen-
sion k and locality r [58]. Let Fq be a finite field with q > n elements. The idea
of this construction is to find a partition A of A ⊂ Fq of size ∣A∣ = n, together
with a good polynomial g(x) for A, see [58, Theorem 3.2 and 3.3].
The code is defined as an evaluation code: C = {(fa(α), α ∈ A) ∶ a ∈
Fqk} where fa(x) is derived from the good polynomial g(x) and a ∈ Fqk . In
turn, recovery of one erased symbol can be done by interpolation over r known
symbols. Thus the locality is r and the minimum distance d = n − k − ⌈k
r
⌉ + 2 is
optimal.
4.3.6 Optimal locally repairable codes based on RS codes
An explicit family of optimal locally repairable codes based on Reed-Solomon
codes is introduced in [59]. The construction is optimal for any length n, di-
mension k and locality r such that r + 1 ∣ n.
Let m = n r
r+1 and 1 < k < r. Take the output of a rs(k,m − k) code, divide
it into m
r
non-overlapping groups, each consisting of r coded symbols. Encode
the symbols of each group into r + 1 new symbols using a specific rs(r,1). The
k × n generator matrix of the LRC code is G = V ⋅ (I ⊗A) where:
• V is a k ×m Vandermonde matrix with the ith column being equal to
v¯i = (1, αi, . . . , αk−1i )t, where {α1, . . . , αm} = Fp;
• I = Im
r
is the m
r
× m
r
identity matrix;
• A is a r×(r+1) matrix having 1 on the main diagonal and w on the lower
diagonal, where w is a primitive element of Fpk+1 . A serves as generator
matrix for the rs(r,1) and it provides the locality property of the code.
The locally repairable code generated by G has locality r and optimal minimum
distance d = n − k − ⌈k
r
⌉ + 2 [59].
4.3.7 Homomorphic self-repairing codes
Let o ∈ FqM be an object of size M to be stored over a network of n nodes.
Let k be a positive integer such that k ∣ M . We can write o = (o1, . . . , ok)
with oi ∈ F
q
M
k
. A homomorphic self-repairing code hsrc(k,n − k) [63] encodes
o = (o1, . . . , ok) as (p(α1), . . . , p(αn)) where
p(x) = k−1∑
i=0 oixq
i ∈ F
q
M
k
[x]
and α1, . . . , αn ∈ F
q
M
k
. The parameters of the code must satisfy k < n ≤ qMk − 1.
Encoding is done via suitable polynomial evaluation and decoding requires
Lagrange interpolation. Self-repair, i.e., the reconstruction of an encoded block,
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is performed as the XOR of some other encoded blocks and satisfies two promi-
nent properties: (1) encoded blocks can be repaired using other encoded blocks
without reconstructing the original data first, (2) a block is repaired from a
fixed number of encoded blocks, the number depending only on the number of
erased blocks.
4.4 Codes for repair bandwidth
In a storage system using erasure coding, the reconstruction operations can
exacerbate the system resources. When a node fails, for its information to be
refreshed, the system needs to transfer data across the network. The bigger
the amount of data, the more bandwidth is used. In this section, we present
state-of-the-art coding schemes that perform repair operations minimising the
amount of data transferred. To this aim, we first introduce the setting of the
seminal paper of Dimakis et al. [46], then we summarize the product-matrix
framework, which has successfully contributed to the construction of explicit
coding schemes.
A data object of size M is divided in k original blocks and encoded into
n coded blocks, which are then distributed to n storage nodes, each storing α
bits. Whenever a node fails, a replacement node downloads from any d surviving
nodes β ≤ α bits each, where d is the number of helper nodes. The total amount
γ = dβ of data downloaded for repair purposes is called repair bandwidth. Data
is stored across n nodes and by connecting to any k nodes is possible to repair
a failed node. The minimality of k implies d ≥ k [55]. If repair is required,
then at least one node is failed, then d ≤ n− 1. Thus, for a code of length n and
dimension k we have k ≤ d ≤ n−1. A code with parameters (n, k,d, α, γ) exists if
a code with storage α and repair bandwidth γ exists. For any α ≥ α∗(d, γ) the
points (n, k,d, α, γ) are feasible, and linear network coding suffice to achieve
them, see [46] for the threshold function α∗(d, γ). The codes sitting on the
points of this tradeoff are termed regenerating codes and two extremal points
are distinguished in [46] and deeply investigated by successive works:
• Minimum-storage-regenerating (MSR) codes achieve the best storage effi-
ciency, and the minimum storage point is given by the pair
(αMSR, γMSR) = (M
k
,
Md
k(d − k + 1)) . (4.2)
MSR codes have equivalent fault tolerance/storage overhead tradeoff as
MDS codes: M
k
bits are stored in each node and any k coded blocks are
sufficient to recover the original file. Moreover, MSR codes outperform
MDS codes in term of the network repair bandwidth.
• Minimum-bandwidth-regenerating (MBR) codes achieve the minimum re-
pair bandwidth, and the minimum bandwidth point is given by the pair
(αMBR, γMBR) = ( 2Md
2kd − k2 + k , 2Md2kd − k2 + k) . (4.3)
Using MBR codes, the storage size α is equal to total number of bits
downloaded γ, so there is no bandwidth overhead, just like replication.
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A common framework used to build explicit regenerating code schemes is
known as the Product-Matrix (PM) framework [55]. Each codeword of a Product-
Matrix (PM) code is represented by a code matrix C ∈Mn×α whose ith row cti
contains the α symbols stored by the ith node C = (ct1 . . . ctn)t. Each code
matrix is the product C = ΨM of an encoding matrix Ψ ∈Mn×d and a message
matrix M ∈ Md×α. The rows of the encoding matrix Ψ = (ψt1 . . . ψtn)t are
called encoding vectors. In particular, ψti is the encoding vector of node i, that
is, ψti is the vector used to encode the message for node i: c
t
i = ψtiM .
Some basic guidelines for the choice of the parameters follow. First, for
redundancy, k should be sufficiently large for the code to be efficient. Then, n
can be chosen for the code to attain the desired availability, just as in the case
of traditional erasure codes. More explicitly, we can estimate the unavailability
probability as U(n, k) = k−1∑
i=0 (ni)ai(1−a)i, where a is the probability that a node
is available [46], and select n accordingly. Once the target level of availability
for the system is fixed, theoretical papers suggest that the best value for the
number of helpers is d = n − 1. However, this choice is not optimal as soon as
the probability that a node is available is strictly smaller than one [64].
4.4.1 Optimal MSR and MBR PM codes
Optimal mbr(k,n−k) codes for any d and msr(k,n−k) for d ≥ 2k−2 with β = 1
are constructed in [55]. Notice that in [65], a proof of non-achievability of the
cut-set bound for msr(k,n − k) with d < 2k − 3 when β = 1 is provided. From
β = 1 we have γ = d, which substituted into equations (4.2) and (4.3) leads to
(αMSR,MMSR) = (d − k + 1, k(d − k + 1)) ; (4.4)
(αMBR,MMBR) = (d, k(2d − k + 1)
2
) . (4.5)
For such a set of parameters, a construction for exact (a failed node is re-
placed with a node storing exactly the same data) and systematic (the M mes-
sage symbols are explicitly present among the kα code symbols stored in k
selected nodes) optimal regenerating codes is given in [55].
Moreover, given an optimal regenerating code of length n, dimension k, d
helpers and parameters (α,β,M), another optimal regenerating code with pa-
rameters (δα, δβ, δM) for any positive integer δ can be constructed by dividing
the δM message symbols into δ groups of M symbols each and applying the(α,β,M) code to each group independently. For MBR and MSR codes, α
β
andM
β
are functions of n, k and d only. It follows that from an optimal MBR or
MSR code of length n, dimension k, d helpers with β = 1, one can construct an
optimal MBR or MSR code of length n, dimension k, d helpers for any β > 1.
This process being called data striping [55].
4.4.2 MBR PM Code
We summarize the construction for mbr(k,n−k) codes with β = 1 from [55]. The
code parameters must satisfy Equation (4.5). First, we prepare the message.
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The d × d message matrix M is defined as the symmetric matrix
M = ( S T
T t 0
) . (4.6)
The submatrix S ∈Mk×k is built such that
• The (k+1
2
) entries in the upper-triangular half of the matrix are filled up
by (k+1
2
) distinct message symbols coming from the set {ui}Mi=1;
• The (k
2
) entries in the strictly lower-triangular portion of the matrix are
then chosen to make the matrix S symmetric.
The matrix T ∈Mk×(d−k) is filled up with the remaining message symbols.
To encode we perform the matrix product C = ΨM , and both Cauchy
and Vandermonde matrices satisfy the requirements for the encoding matrix
Ψ. However, these matrices lead to non-systematic codes. In order to have
systematic encoding, the authors of [55] choose
Ψ = (Ik 0
Ψ˜ ∆˜
)
where Ik is the k × k identity matrix and [Ψ˜ ∆˜] forms a (n − k) × d Cauchy or
Vandermonde matrix, and perform encoding with the matrix in Equation (4.6).
This code can repair any failed node by connecting to any d out of the n− 1
alive node [55, Theorem 2]. Suppose node f fails. Let us call H = {h1, . . . , hd}
the set of arbitrary d helper nodes and consider Ψrepair = (ψth1 . . . ψthd)t.
Stored in any d out the n − 1 alive nodes, we find cti = ψtiM for i ∈H. Then, we
compute ctiψ
t
f = ψtiMψtf for i ∈H and get
v = ΨrepairMψf = (ψth1Mψtf . . . ψthdMψtf)t .
We retrieveMψf from v through left multiplication by Ψ−1repair, that is, (Mψf) =
Ψ−1repairv. Equivalently, we can solve the linear system Ψrepair(Mψf) = v.
The authors of [64] evaluate the computational costs of the proposed product-
matrix code. The non-systematic scheme doubles the encoding costs and quadru-
ples the decoding costs when compared to non-systematic Reed-Solomon codes.
Due to the pre-coding step, the systematic product-matrix code is more costly
than the non-systematic one. In particular, the product-matrix code in system-
atic form rises the encoding costs by a factor of 7 when compared to systematic
Reed-Solomon codes.
4.4.3 Repair-by-transfer PM codes
The problem of the I/O overhead is not solved by MSR codes, which generally
are inferior to RS codes in this regard. This does not mean either that RS are
good in I/O: the reconstruction operations of a rs(k,n−k) result in k times the
amount of disk I/O and network transfer compared to replication. Building on
the MSR PM code from [55], labelled vanilla codes in their systematic version,
the I/O overhead problem is addressed in [51].
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The authors of [51] identify two properties of a MSR code, satisfied in partic-
ular by vanilla codes, that help in transforming the code into a disk-read optimal
one, while retaining the storage-reliability-bandwidth optimality. In particular,
the I/O optimized version of vanilla codes, called PM-RBT codes, reduces by a
factor of about d − k + 1 the number of I/O consumed, for general parameters.
An implementation for PM-RBT codes is available at [66].
The reconstruction of vanilla codes goes as follows. Every block 1 ≤ i ≤ n is
assigned a reconstruction vector gi = (gi1, . . . , giα)t of length α and the n vectors{g1, . . . , gn} are designed so that any α of them are linearly independent, where
α is the stripe-width, that is, the number of symbols per data block.
A block f can be repaired by any set D of d helper nodes hosting one of
the remaining n − 1 blocks of the stripe. Let thfD be the symbol that a helper
node h transfers for the reconstruction of f when the set of helpers is D. For
reconstruction of block f , the helper node h computes and transfers the symbols:
thfD = D∑
j=1 shjgfj (4.7)
where {sh1, . . . , shα} are the α symbols stored in node h. Then, the decoding
node (the node performing the reconstruction) receives th1fD, . . . , thdfD and use
them to reconstruct f . Vanilla codes are not optimal in I/O as most coefficients
gij are non-zero and sij must be read for every gij ≠ 0.
To optimize such codes with respect to I/O the vector gf in equation (4.7)
must be a unit vector and thfD ∈ {sh1, . . . , shw}. Then, the helper is said to
perform Reconstruction-By-Transfer (RBT), that is, it does not perform any
computation and just sends one stored symbol to the decoding node, and it is
called a RBT-helper. At a RBT-helper, the amount of data read from the disk
is equal to the amount sent through the network. An algorithm to choose RBT-
helpers so that the I/O consumed during reconstruction is optimized across the
system is presented in [51, Algorithm 2].
4.4.4 Butterfly codes
Butterfly codes are binary systematic msr(k,n− k) codes with d = n− 1 helpers
and redundancy n−k = 2 [60]. Given k ≥ 2, the butterfly(k,2) code with d = k+
1 can be constructed as follows. The matrix Dk ∈M2k−1×k(F2) represents a data
object to be encoded. In Dk we distinguish two matrices A,X ∈M2k−2×k−1(F2),
and two column vectors a, x ∈ M2k−2×1(F2). We label the columns as Dik for
0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, that is
Dk = (a Ax X) = (Dk−1k . . . D0k) .
The systematic codeword we obtain via encoding is Ck = (Dk−1k , . . . ,D0k,H,B)
where H =H(Dk) is the horizontal parity and B = B(Dk) is the butterfly parity.
For k = 2, H(m11 m12
m21 m22
) = (m11 ⊕m12
m21 ⊕m22)
B (m11 m12
m21 m22
) = ( m12 ⊕m21
m11 ⊕m12 ⊕m22)
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whereas, for k > 2
H(Dk) = ( a⊕H(A)Pk−1[Pk−1x⊕H(Pk−1X)])
B(Dk) = ( Pk−1x⊕ B(A)Pk−1[a⊕H(A)⊕ B(Pk−1X)])
where Pk−1 is the k ×k anti-diagonal matrix with counter-diagonal elements set
to 1 and all other elements equal to 0.
Butterfly codes can decode the original matrix when any two of the codeword
columns are missing, hence they are MDS [60]. For the recovery of a single
column the amount of data that is transferred is optimal and equals half of the
remaining data. The amount of data read to repair is also optimal, except when
we recover the butterfly parity.
Butterfly codes are implemented and tested in HDFS (encoding is a back-
ground job) and Ceph (online encoding) demonstrating that the encoding ap-
proach (online/background) highly impacts the performance of the system. The
real-time approach (Ceph) achieves efficient storage utilization but suffers high
storage access overhead due to excessive fragmentation. In Ceph the small mes-
sage size comes as a consequence of the online encoding which reduces the size of
the encoded messages and hence the size of a symbol [60]. The background data
encoding (HDFS) achieves better performance but reduces the storage efficiency
because the input data is stored before being encoded.
4.4.5 Hitchhiker
Hitchhiker is an erasure code built on top of Reed-Solomon codes with the aim
of reducing network traffic and disk I/O during reconstruction without increas-
ing the storage overhead [67]. The construction is based on the Piggybacking
framework, which operates on pairs of stripes of a RS code [68].
The Hitchhiker erasure code optimizes only the reconstruction of data blocks:
reconstruction of parity blocks is performed as for Reed-Solomon codes. Fur-
thermore, Hitchhiker optimizes data reconstruction for single failures only. If
multiple blocks belonging to a single codeword are unavailable, Hitchhiker per-
forms reconstruction as the RS code.
We now summarize the three versions of Hitchhiker, using as example the
Hitchhiker code of length 14 and dimension 10, extensively described in [67].
For 1 ≤ i ≤ 14, let bi be the i-th block of a representative Hitchhiker codeword.
Opposite to the 20 blocks used to repair a pair of stripes of the rs(10,4) code,
for a pair of codewords:
• Hitchhiker-XOR reconstructs blocks bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 6 using 13 blocks, and
blocks bi for 7 ≤ i ≤ 10 using 14 blocks, and requires only XOR operations
in addition to the underlying RS reconstruction.
• Hitchhiker-XOR+ recovers any block using any other 13 blocks, but re-
quires the underlying RS code to have the all-XOR-parity property, that
is, one of the parity blocks must be the XOR of all the data blocks.
• Hitchhiker-nonXOR recovers any block using any other 13 blocks, at the
cost of additional finite-field arithmetic.
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The increase in computational time for Hitchhiker due to the extra operations
is compensated by the decrease in reconstruction time and by the reduction in
the amount of data read and downloaded during repair.
4.5 LDPC codes
Performance and efficiency of erasure coding is crucial in distributed storage
systems. Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes have arisen as an alterna-
tive to standard erasure codes, such as Reed-Solomon codes, trading off vastly
improved decoding performance for inefficiencies in the amount of data required
to perform decoding. For a LDPC code encoding k equal-sized data blocks into
n equal-sized coded blocks to be distributed over the network, the decoding
requires to download fk coded blocks to calculate the original k data blocks,
with f > 1. For suitable degree distributions λ and ρ, there are codes that
asymptotically achieve capacity, that is, they may be successfully decoded with
fk downloaded blocks, where f → 1 from above as k → ∞. But in distributed
systems we cannot break data in infinitely many pieces. Nevertheless, research
on LDPC codes typically studies their collective and asymptotic behaviour. In
the following, we overview established results about finite length LDPC codes.
4.5.1 Analysis of LDPC codes for finite lengths
In [23], three types of “born-to-be-long” codes are analysed to assess their per-
formance for finite lengths, namely n ranges in
{2i ∶ 1 ≤ i ≤ 75} ∪ {250,500,1250,2500,2500,5000,12500,25000,50000,125000}.
For rates k
n
∈ { 1
3
, 1
2
, 2
3
}, systematic, IRA and Gallagher codes are tested over a
collection of 80 published distributions λ and ρ via Monte Carlo simulations.
The average number of blocks required to successfully reconstruct the data over
1000 random downloads is reported using the overhead factor f . For example,
if k = 100 and n = 200, f = 1.10 means that on average 110 random blocks of
the total 200 blocks are required to reconstruct the 100 original blocks of data.
For the three rates, the overhead factor f starts at 1 when n = 1, increases
with n up to n = 20, then it flattens. Finally, f decreases after n = 100, see
[23, Figure 5]. Opposite, the reconstruction performance in term of f is differ-
ent among the three types of codes and for small n systematic codes perform
the best. However, after n = 100, IRA codes outperform the others, see [23,
Figure 6].
Moreover, published distributions are inadequate for producing codes with
a small overhead factor f for small n. Following the notation in [23], we call
published codes LDPC codes arising from the list of 80 published distributions for
λ and ρ. We call Monte Carlo codes the ones generated as follows: first generate
random λ and ρ, then determine the ten best pairs minimizing f , finally pick
random ρ for the ten best λ and conversely. Distributions for derived codes are
obtained from the best published and Monte Carlo codes using their left and
right nodes quantities to define new λ and ρ. For n ≤ 15 Monte Carlo codes
give the best results and for about 15 ≤ n ≤ 100, derived codes perform the best,
while after n = 100, published and derived codes are roughly equivalent.
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A comparison of LDPC against RS codes is presented in [23]: the time for
downloading to a client is combined with the time for reconstruction, and used to
calculate the average time to download a file of size 1GB. Among LDPC codes,
systematic codes outperform IRA codes, which in turn outperform Gallagher
codes. As the download speed improves, the rate increases and n increases,
LDPC codes greatly outperform RS codes. However, when n is small (about
n ≤ 30 depending on the rate) and the download speed is slow, RS outperform
LDPC codes.
4.5.2 Repair bandwidth analysis
The repair bandwidth is defined in the average sense in [22]: if a variable node
is erased, the repair bandwidth to refresh that variable node is the number
of blocks downloaded, averaged over all choices of neighbouring check nodes
(assuming all other variable nodes to be pristine). This value is then averaged
over all variable nodes. In particular, let di be the degree of the check node i
and E the number of edges in the Tanner graph. Then, the (average) repair
bandwidth γ is defined as
γ =
n−k∑
i=1 di(di − 1)
E
. (4.8)
For the average variable/check node degree al and ar (we write l and r when
the code is left/right regular), the following statements hold [22]:
• A regular check node degree r minimizes the repair bandwidth, and this
minimal value is γ = r − 1 [22, Lemma 1];
• A graph yields a LDPC code of rate k
n
with minimum repair bandwidth if
and only if the graph is both check node regular and variable node regular
with r = almin
1− kn and l = almin [22, Theorem 1]. The authors set almin = 2 as
it must be almin ≥ 2 to reconstruct single erasures.
The repair bandwidth γ of a LDPC code does not depend on n but on the av-
erage check node degree ar. Moreover, γ and ar increase with kn for a fixed al.
Unfortunately, regular LDPC codes are known not to reach the channel capac-
ity [21], thus the repair bandwidth minimality has to be relaxed to improve
reliability. In particular the condition on variable nodes is relaxed in [22], pre-
serving the check node regularity, i.e., ρ(x) = xr−1 so that γmin = r − 1. Then, a
small value of r is required for repair efficiency and this must be tradedoff for
ensuring the desired reliability level. In [22, Table I], we find some left degree
distributions designed for the decoding threshold to achieve the BEC capacity.
In the best case the designed decoding threshold is 98.4% with respect to the
BEC capacity.
4.5.3 Finite-length analysis
A finite-length analysis of LDPC codes over the BEC is given in [24]. A regular
ensemble of LDPC codes C(n,xl−1, xr−1) is characterized by block length n, vari-
able nodes degree l and check nodes degree r. Let P(G,α) be the block erasure
probability when transmitting over the BECα, see equation (1.1), using a code
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G ∈ C(n,xl−1, xr−1) and a message-passing decoder. Then, EC(n,xl−1,xr−1)[P(G,α)]
denotes the ensemble average over all realizations of the channel.
Although the behaviour of a particular code can differ significantly from
that of the cycle-free case for moderate block lengths, the behaviour of individ-
ual instances is likely to concentrate around the ensemble average. An exact
expression for the ensemble average is [24]
EC(n,xl−1,xr−1)[P(G,α)] = n lr−1∑
e=0 αe(1 − α)n−e(1 − N(e, n
l
r
,0)
T (e) ) + n∑
e=n lr α
e(1 − α)n−e
where T (e) = (nl)!(nl−el)! and N(v, c, d) is defined in [24, Equations (2.1)-(2.4)].
The quantity 1 − N(e,n lr ,0)
T (e) is the probability that a randomly chosen subset
of size e of the variable nodes contains a nonempty stopping set, while the
probability that the size of the erasure set is e is given by αe(1 −α)n−e. Notice
that the probability that a randomly chosen subset of size e of the variable nodes
contains a nonempty stopping set goes to 1 for e ≥ n l
r
, that is, more than n l
r
erasures cause data loss.
4.5.4 Reliability analysis
The reliability of LDPC codes is studied using the Markov model for non-MDS
codes as presented in Section 3.2 in [22], and the unconditional probability for
the Markov model is estimated by decoding simulations of the LDPC codes on
the binary erasure channel. The closed form solution for the MTTDL in [22,
Lemma 2] confirms that increasing the stopping number improves the reliability.
When the left degree is l = 2, the stopping number is half the girth, see
Section 2.2.2. Then, we must increase the girth, to rise the reliability of a reg-
ular LDPC codes with l = 2. With this motivating reason, the design of LDPC
code with good girth properties using the PEG algorithm [69] is done in [22].
The authors fix l = 2 and rate k
n
= 2
3
and generate a few PEG-LDPC codes for
those parameters. In [22, Table III], a comparison of the PEG-LDPC codes
against RS codes and LRC codes based on storage overhead, repair bandwidth
and MTTDL shows that the most reliable LDPC code, ldpc(140,70), has di-
mension 140 and length 210. The ldpc(140,70) code is more reliable than the
rs(10,5) code while halving the repair bandwidth and entailing the same storage
overhead. Moreover, the LDPC code with length 60 and dimension 40 has the
same reliability as xorbas(10,6), see Section 4.3.3.
4.5.5 Tornado codes for MAID archival storage
Massive Arrays of Idle Disks (MAID) have been proposed as a low-power and
lower-latency replacement for magnetic tapes as a backing store. The Tornado
Coded Archival Storage (TCAS) system, developed and implemented in [70],
is combined with a MAID simulator to emulate a large scale storage system.
The TCAS file-system breaks files into extents and aggregates the extents into
fixed-size stripes. When a stripe is full or a timeout expires, the entire stripe
is encoded and distributed to storage devices. Each stripe consists of 48 data
blocks and 48 redundant blocks of size 1 MB.
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Figure 4.1: Entanglement logical flow.
The TCAS system is deployed on a 12 storage servers cluster and because
the Tornado code has length 96, a cyclic 96:12 mapping is used to associate
coded blocks with devices. TCAS designers test three Tornado codes with the
above parameters in high availability configuration and show that the three
codes survive the loss of any three storage servers [70, Figure 8].
4.6 STeP-archival
In this section we revisit STeP-archival, the technique presented in [71] for cre-
ating interdependencies between data to be stored and data already archived in
the system. Entanglement allows to enhance desirable properties for the stor-
age system, namely anti-censorship, see Chapter 7 and reliability, see Chapter 8.
Upon archival, the blocks of a document are entangled with some blocks of doc-
uments previously archived in the system. The entanglement builds strong ties
between content, hindering data loss and preventing silent censorship of rarely
accessed data. In particular, an attacker wishing to censor a target document
must cause collateral damage by corrupting several other archived documents.
More formally, a (s, t, e, p)-archive [71] is a storage system where each archived
document consists of a codeword of s source blocks, t pointers or tangled blocks
(i.e., old blocks already archived in the system), p parity blocks, and that can
correct e = p − s erasures per codeword. The logical flow to archive a document
in a (s, t, e, p)-archive is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The document to be archived
is split into s ≥ 1 source blocks (solid fill) Ê. From the archive, t distinct old
blocks, the pointers (dot pattern), are selected Ë and a linear code C (s+ t,p) is
used to create p ≥ s parity blocks (stripe pattern) Ì depending on both source
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blocks and pointers. In particular, if the p parity blocks are computed using a
rs(s + t,p) code, then any s + t blocks of the codeword are necessary and suffi-
cient to reconstruct all its s+ t+p blocks, see Section 2.1. In the last step Í, we
only archive the p parity blocks, making the code non-systematic. The t pointer
blocks come from the archive so we do not need to store them again. The choice
of not storing the source blocks enhances security [71]. As a tradeoff, read per-
formance is degraded both in terms of latency and bandwidth since reading a
document from a STeP-archive always requires a decoding operation involving
s+ t blocks, as opposed to a systematic code where the s alive source blocks can
be directly accessed.
4.6.1 STeP-archive asymmetry
For an archived document to be lost, it is not sufficient to destroy its code
blocks because they can be recovered recursively. On the one hand, it has been
proven [71] that finding the minimal set of documents required to irrecoverably
censor a target document is NP-hard. On the other hand, the system can repair
a recoverable loss using a simple and efficient reconstruction algorithm: we first
scan the archive and build a set C of corrupted document with at most e erased
blocks. We pick a document from C, repair it, and update the set of documents
with at most e erased blocks in C. The algorithm stops when C is empty. At
this point, either the system is completely repaired or there is a closed set of
documents with strictly more than e erased blocks.
4.6.2 Practical resilience to censorship
Since censoring a document optimally is NP-hard, to evaluate the resistance of
the system against data loss, one can rely on suboptimal heuristics. In Chap-
ter 7, we exploit the greedy attacks as well as a branch and bound technique
introduced in [71]. We include a brief summary and refer the reader to [71] for
more details.
We play the attacker and we select a target to be censored. Erasing blocks
in the target produces erasures in other documents because of entanglement. To
prevent recursive repair we must corrupt those documents as well. So at each
step of the attack we face the choice of which block to delete and we use one of
two greedy heuristics to make the decision:
• The leaping attack leverages the fact that it is easier to attack recent doc-
uments rather than old ones (because they have fewer incoming pointers).
• The creeping attack tries to keep the set of corrupted documents as com-
pact in time as possible by preferring documents having approximately
the same archival date, which is very effective against window-constrained
entanglement strategies.
It is possible to improve on these greedy heuristics by means of a branch and
bound technique: at each step of the computation of the minimal set of blocks
to be erased, we retain the best partial solutions up a certain buffer size and
expand all of them.
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Chapter 5
Worst-case, information and
all-blocks locality in
distributed storage systems:
An explicit comparison
5.1 Introduction
The easiest way to provide reliability in distributed storage systems is with data
replication. Replication has interesting properties, including its relative simplic-
ity and the fact that a system can repair a failed data object by fetching and
copying any of its replicas, which is optimal. Unfortunately, replication entails
a significant storage overhead, which can be decreased with erasure correcting
codes. With a systematic linear code of length n and dimension k, each code-
word consists of n blocks: k source blocks for the original data, and n−k parity
blocks. The storage overhead is n−k
k
, and if the code is MDS, any k of the
n blocks are necessary and sufficient to decode the codeword and recover the
original data, see Section 2.1. In distributed storage systems the n blocks are
typically distributed on different physical disks, thus a MDS code can tolerate
up to n−k disk failures, which is optimal. MDS codes, especially Reed-Solomon
codes, are commonly used in practice, for instance by Facebook [40, 72].
Distributed storage systems execute periodic repair procedures during which
one of the most frequent error occurrence is a single failed block per codeword.
Unfortunately, MDS codes were not designed for this purpose and have the pro-
hibitive drawback that k blocks must be fetched to repair a single failure. A lot
of research has therefore been recently dedicated to improve the repair locality
and repair bandwidth of state-of-the-art codes, and to design new codes tailored
for storage. Locally Repairable Codes (LRC), introduced in Section 4.3, can re-
pair a small number of block erasures with less than k blocks at the price of an
increased storage overhead, offering a tradeoff between MDS codes and replica-
tion. Codes with good locality are now used by major cloud operators such as
Microsoft in their Azure storage service [41] and virtualisation platform [73].
Despite the recent advancements of codes with good locality properties, there
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is a big gap between theory and practice, in the sense that most LRCs cannot
be realistically implemented in practical systems due to performance shortcom-
ings such as high encoding/decoding/repair complexity and latency. Moreover,
information locality and locality are sometimes used interchangeably, while it
should be clear that whenever a code only offers information locality, there are
stored blocks that do not benefit from the property.
We select the Hamming Code (Ham) as representative of codes with all-
blocks locality : Ham can repair every block with three other blocks, which is
optimal for codes with length 7 and dimension 4. Furthermore, Ham is highly
efficient on modern architectures because it encodes, decodes and repairs using
only hardware-implemented XOR operations. In this chapter, we provide:
• An efficient way to recover all theoretically-recoverable failures for Ham;
• A comparison of Ham against two systematic linear coding schemes with
same storage overhead and different locality properties.
We describe encoding, decoding and repair algorithms for Ham, and formally
study its locality and fault tolerance. We then evaluate our prototype with
both synthetic failures and real-world traces against two codes with the same
storage overhead: a rs(4,3) and a pyramid code of length 7 and dimension 4
with information locality 2 built from a rs(4,2), see Section 4.3.2. Comparing
for the same level of storage overhead implies that the two non-MDS have lower
fault tolerance. Nevertheless the three schemes can withstand as many losses
as triplication does, while entailing a storage overhead of 75%. We show that
Ham provides faster encoding, faster repair and lower repair bandwidth than
the other two codes and we discuss how this improves the fault tolerance by
estimating the mean time to data loss. Ham decreases the repair bandwidth by
up to 26%, and repairs 5 times faster.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The existing codes
used for comparison are presented in Section 5.2. Fault tolerance and repair pro-
cedure are analysed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. Finally, we evaluate the
performance of our implementation in Section 5.5 and conclude in Section 5.6.
5.2 Linear codes for comparison
For the definitions of block locality, code locality, information locality and all-
blocks locality, we refer to Section 4.2.3. We write (k,n− k, r) to denote a code
of length n, dimension k with locality r ≤ k and (k,n−k, ⟨r⟩) for a code of length
n, dimension k with information locality r.
We now introduce three explicit linear codes for the three types of locality: a
Reed-Solomon code for worst-case locality, a recently proposed pyramid code for
information locality and Ham an optimal locally repairable code for all-blocks
locality. We refer to Section 2.1 for an introduction on Reed-Solomon codes and
to Section 4.3.2 for the locality definitions. We operate over F28 : addition over
F28 is simply the bitwise XOR ⊕ and we perform the modular reduction [15]
using the primitive polynomial x8 +x4 +x3 +x2 +1, whose binary representation
is 100011101 [74].
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5.2.1 Worst-case locality: rs(4,3)
We consider a systematic Reed-Solomon code rs(4,3) of length 7 and dimen-
sion 4 over F28 based on a Hankel matrix [75]. To build a Hankel matrix we
define βi ≜ 11−αi where α is a primitive element of F28 . We extract a rectangular
submatrix H of size k × (n − k) from the triangle
β1 β2 β3 β4 ⋯ β255
β2 β3 β4 ⋯ β255⋮
β254 β255
β255
and build the Hankel-form generator matrix G = (Ik ∣ H) where Ik is the k × k
identity matrix. The rs(4,3) code is thus generated by
Grs(4,3) =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0 0 244 167 157
0 1 0 0 167 157 114
0 0 1 0 157 114 237
0 0 0 1 114 237 95
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (5.1)
5.2.2 Information locality: Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩)
Pyramid codes are built on top of an embedded MDS code, as explained in
Section 4.3.2. In particular, we build a pyramid code Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩) of length 7,
dimension 4 and information locality 2 on top of a rs(4,2) over F28 whose gen-
erator matrix in Hankel form is derived from the first six columns of Grs(4,3)
in (5.1) partitioning the sixth. The generator matrix of our Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩) pyra-
mid code is therefore given by the first 5 columns of (5.1) and columns 6 and 7
are respectively (167,157,0,0) and (0,0,114,237).
The pyramid code retains the minimum distance of the embedded RS code
and hence it is not MDS. However, the extra redundancy improves the infor-
mation locality: for a codeword (b0, b1, . . . , b6), we have b5 = 167b0 + 157b1 and
b6 = 114b2 + 237b3. Notice that block b4 has locality 4; indeed the pyramid code
offers only information locality.
5.2.3 All-blocks locality: Ham
We now present Ham and describe its properties. The Hamming code Ham
is an optimal systematic locally repairable code of length 7, dimension 4 and
locality 3. Its choice is based on two main reasons:
• The supports of the codewords of weight 4 of the Extended Hamming
code form a 3-(8,4,1) design [13] and such a design can be exploited for
repairing Ham, as seen in Section 5.4.
• Non-trivial binary MDS codes (that is codes with k ≠ 1, n − 1 reaching
the Singleton bound d ≤ n − k + 1) over F2 do not exist [76]. Hence, codes
optimal with respect to the generalized bound (4.1), i.e., d ≤ n−k−⌈k
r
⌉+2,
should be targeted.
43
0 휇 휇 휇
훔3훔2훔1훔0
1 2 3 DL훅2
Figure 5.1: Markov chain. States correspond to the number of erasures and
DL represents the data loss state. The blue dotted arrow applies to Ham and
Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩), i.e., δ2 = 0 for rs(4,3).
We end up at the Hamming code starting from a 4 × 4 identity matrix (for the
code to be systematic) and then adding three different parity columns with three
1s each to ensure locality 3, while paying attention to place only two overlapping
1s on each row to maximize the minimum distance,
1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
GHam = .
Lemma 1. Ham has minimum distance d = 3 and locality r = 3, which is opti-
mal.
Proof. The minimum distance of the Hamming code is well-known [13]. For
the locality, we can easily see that each parity block is the sum of exactly three
source blocks, and that each source block is the sum of exactly one parity block
and two other source blocks. These parameters are optimal because they achieve
the bound d ≤ n − k − ⌈k
r
⌉ + 2 with equality, see Section 4.3.
Ham has the additional property that it does not require multiplications
over finite fields since the elements of GHam are 0s and 1s. This makes Ham
easily amenable to fast implementations in hardware using only XOR operations.
Moreover, Ham can work on bytes, being the XOR operation defined on F28 ,
without any need for finite field arithmetic. The Ham parities can be computed
by XORing the appropriate message bytes, thus Ham can process blocks of the
same size as the rs(4,3) and Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩) codes. Note that on modern storage
systems, the block size is much larger than the field size.
5.3 Fault tolerance analysis
We use the mean time to data loss (MTTDL) to compare the fault tolerance
offered by the three schemes. We estimate the MTTDL using a Markov model,
as explained in Chapter 3.
We compute the fraction r(j) of failures of size j that can be corrected by
the three codes: r(j) = 0 for all j greater or equal to the minimum distance of
the code. rs(4,3) is MDS, thus its j-erasures properties are r(0) = r(1) = r(2) =
r(3) = 1.
Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩) is built on top of rs(4,2), thus it can correct every 2-erasures,
i.e., r(0) = r(1) = r(2) = 1. By exhaustive search, we also find that the pyramid
code can correct 26 out of the (7
3
) = 35 3-erasures, thus r(3) = 26
35
= 74.29%.
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The minimum distance of Ham is 3, thus r(0) = r(1) = r(2) = 1, and like
the pyramid code it can correct some 3-erasures. To compute the number of
repairable 3-erasures, consider a codeword with blocks
(b0, b1, b2, b3, b4 = b1 ⊕ b2 ⊕ b3, b5 = b0 ⊕ b2 ⊕ b3, b6 = b0 ⊕ b1 ⊕ b3).
Block b0 appears in b0, b5, b6, thus the 3-erasures in positions {0,5,6} are
irrecoverable. The same is true for {1,4,6} and {2,4,5}. Then notice that
b0 ⊕ b4 = b1 ⊕ b5 = b2 ⊕ b6 and they all contain b3, hence the erasure patterns{0,3,4}, {1,3,5}, {2,3,6} are also irrecoverable. All the other 3-erasures are
repairable, thus r(3) = 35−7
35
= 80%.
Knowing the j-erasures properties, we can define pj , the probability that the
coding scheme can tolerate one more failure, given that j failures have already
occurred: pj = r(j+1)r(j) where r(j) is the unconditional probability that the code
can tolerate j failures as defined above. We compute p ≜ (p0, p1, p2) for the
three codes. We get p = (1,1,1) for rs(4,3), p = (1,1,0.74286) for Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩)
and p = (1,1,0.8) for Ham.
The MTTDL takes into account the maintenance offered by the repair pro-
cess by means of the drive rebuild rate µ. Also, we call λ the drive failure rate
(we set λ = 1
500000
hours [42]).
We consider a Markov chain with states corresponding to the number of
erasures, with transition rates σj for j = {0,1,2} given by σj = (n − j)λpj , see
Section 3.2, and σ3 = (n − 3)λ, where n is the length of the code. For the two
non-MDS codes δ2 = (n − 2)λ(1 − p2), whereas δ2 = 0 for rs(4,3). The Markov
chain is shown in Figure 5.1. The transition matrix for the Markov model is
given by
P = ⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
−σ0 σ0 0 0 0
µ −(µ + σ1) σ1 0 0
0 µ −(µ + σ2 + δ2) σ2 δ2
0 0 µ −(µ + σ3) σ3
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
where the last column represents the absorbing state corresponding to data
loss and each row represents a non-absorbing state. We use Pˆ , the negative
of P deprived of the last column, to compute MTTDL per stripe as the first
component y1 of the solution of the linear system Pˆy = 1. We postpone explicit
results to Section 5.5, as we will use our simulation to get estimates for the
rebuild rate µ.
5.4 Repair algorithms
This section describes the repair mechanisms implemented by the three codes.
The repair method takes as input alive blocks of a codeword and outputs the
codeword itself. Given enough alive blocks, rs(4,3) and Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩) compute
missing blocks in two steps: first the original message is retrieved and then it
is re-encoded to get all blocks of the codeword. Ham needs one step only as it
repairs erased blocks directly.
rs(4,3) Whenever the number of erasures is at most 3, this code fetches four
valid blocks and apply Gaussian elimination on a 4 × 4 system.
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Figure 5.2: Relationships between the blocks of a Ham codeword. Each column
corresponds to a parity equation involving the blocks in grey.
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Figure 5.3: Latency of encoding, decoding and repair.
Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩) The repair procedure for the pyramid code implies two steps.
First, it attempts to recover data blocks by linear combination. Second, if the
required redundant blocks are not available, the code falls back on a RS-like
repair procedure, in which case there is no performance gain compared to the
embedded RS code.
Ham Figure 5.2 depicts the relationships between blocks of Ham codewords.
For each column of the figure, the XOR of the grey blocks is 0, thus three grey
blocks are sufficient to infer the fourth. For instance, the first column indicates
that b0 ⊕ b2 ⊕ b3 ⊕ b5 = 0. To repair an erased block, we look for a column from
Figure 5.2 where the erased block is grey, fetch the other three grey blocks and
XOR them to recover the erased one.
5.5 Evaluation
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the performance of Ham. First
we provide a set of micro-benchmarks to evaluate the encoding, decoding and
repair latency. Then, we evaluate the bandwidth costs under synthetic faults.
Finally, we inject a 12-hour trace from a large-scale deployment. We compare
the performance of Ham against the rs(4,3) and Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩) presented in
Section 5.2.3. We leverage a full, yet not optimized, prototype of the code
implemented in Python.
5.5.1 Micro-benchmark: latency
We begin our evaluation by measuring the latency of the schemes to encode, de-
code and repair input data of increasing size (from 32 kB to 128 kB). Figure 5.3
presents our results. Ham outperforms rs(4,3) and Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩) in encoding,
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Figure 5.4: Bandwidth: number of blocks used by repair.
up to 1.5× and 1.2× respectively. This directly derives from the absence of mul-
tiplications in Ham, as opposed to rs(4,3) and Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩). The decoding
latency results are basically equivalent across the three codes: since they are
systematic (with dimension k = 4), the decoding operation trivially consists in
reading the first 4 blocks of the codeword.
The repair micro-benchmark consists in erasing up to 2 random blocks (or
25% of the codeword) and repairing them as fast as possible. We explain the
gap in repair performances among the codes as follows. rs(4,3) systematically
solves a 4 × 4 linear system by Gaussian elimination for every erased block,
which is costly (O(k3) in the dimension of the matrix). Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩) exploits its
information locality: when there is only one erasure per codeword, Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩)
fetches 2 blocks for repair (if the failure is not in the 4th position, in such a case
Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩) fetches 4 blocks). However, if more than one erasure occurs,
Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩) needs to process at least as many blocks as the Reed-Solomon
code. In this case, Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩) never outperforms rs(4,3) in terms of latency.
On the other hand, Ham never uses Gaussian elimination by leveraging its
XOR-based structure. The repair of one failed block results in 2 XORs. If
multiple failures occur, Ham fetches 5 blocks and recovers the whole codeword
executing 6 XORs. This leads to a factor of 5× speed-up in latency with respect
to rs(4,3) and Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩). Throughput results are in the same line as latency
results.
We can now complete our fault-tolerance analysis. We set µ = 1 for Ham
and µ = 5 for the other two codes and get
rs(4,3) Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩) Ham
MTTDLstripe (hrs) 4.7645 ⋅ 1015 3.7031 ⋅ 1012 1.1904 ⋅ 1014
The fault-tolerance of Ham is lower than the one of rs(4,3) because of its lower
minimum distance, but higher than the one of Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩) thanks to the
repair rate.
5.5.2 Micro-benchmark: repair bandwidth
To evaluate the network bandwidth costs of the three codes, we simulate a
cluster of 128 remotely distributed nodes. We make the nodes crash at very
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Figure 5.5: Real-world fault trace: network bandwidth required to repair the
system during a 12-hour trace.
high rates during a period of 1 minute. Figure 5.4(a) and Figure 5.4(b) present
our results for two challenging scenarios, where 1.5% and 5% of the nodes fail
every second. We present the mean and standard deviation of the number of
blocks fetched during the repair process. Ham consistently fetches fewer blocks,
demonstrating the advantage of codes with low locality.
5.5.3 Benchmark: real-world fault trace
We conclude our evaluation by means of a real-world trace [77]. We replay 12
hours of the trace, during which between 112 and 120 simulated nodes are avail-
able. The fault dynamic injected in the system is depicted on top of Figure 5.5.
In this experiment, the nodes are used to store 2 kB of data. After the 12 hours
of the trace, Ham required 11.35 MB to repair the system, as opposed to the
14.33 MB of rs(4,3) (+%26) or 13.97 MB of Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩) (+%23).
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we compare three linear coding schemes offering different lo-
cality properties: Ham, a locally repairable code with all-blocks locality r = 3,
rs(4,3), a Reed-Solomon code representing the worst-case locality r = k = 4, and
Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩), a Pyramid code with information locality ⟨r⟩ = 2.
We experimentally evaluate Ham using simulations and a real-world fault
trace. Our results show the benefits of relying on efficient XOR operations for
encoding, as well as increased performance at repairing faulty systems.
We also present an efficient method for repairing Ham based on designs.
When compared to rs(4,3) and Pyr(4,3, ⟨2⟩), Ham shows lower latency, thanks
to the repairing procedure. Similarly, using a real-world trace, Ham consumes
less bandwidth thanks to its all-blocks locality property.
Our results also highlight how information locality and locality should not
be confused: we show that a code offering information locality can outperform
standard MDS codes in term of repair bandwidth when few erasures occur, and
that such a restriction does not apply to the code with all-blocks locality.
48
Chapter 6
Block placement for fault
resilient distributed tuple
spaces
6.1 Introduction
We are currently observing a deluge of data originated by our personal devices.
Distributed applications must be able to efficiently collect, store, process and
expose data. When dealing with such applications, developers need to settle
on a specific programming model, to i) facilitate the implementation of such
systems and ii) retain user-friendliness and ability to scale, both horizontally
and geographically. Distributed storage systems are one prominent example
of such applications. They are typically operated across wide area networks,
such as Amazon AWS, which currently comprises 15 geographical regions.1 In
such deployment scenarios, applications must transparently tolerate faults, a
common threat for distributed systems.
The basic strategy to tolerate faults is to rely on block replication, which
entails a huge storage overhead. A state-of-the-art solution to decrease such
overhead while providing the same level of fault tolerance is to use erasure
coding techniques. With a systematic linear code of length n and dimension k,
each codeword consists of n blocks: k source blocks for the original data, and
n − k redundant blocks. The storage overhead is n−k
k
, and if the code is MDS,
any k of the n blocks are necessary and sufficient to recover the original data,
as detailed is Section 2.1.
From a fault tolerance point of view, it is optimal to place the n blocks
of a codeword on different logical units (with respect to failures), so that the
MDS code can tolerate up to n − k failures. A logical unit can be a single
node (in this case for the optimum it is sufficient to place different blocks of
a codeword on different nodes), but it can also be a cluster of nodes (e.g., a
set of machines physically hosted in a single room can go down at the same
moment if the cooling system of the room fails). In this second scenario, one
is tempted to spread different blocks of a codeword into separate and faraway
1http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/using-regions-availability-zones.html
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clusters. Although being optimal with respect to fault tolerance, this solution
affects negatively the latency to fetch the blocks.
The case of distributed tuple spaces A programming model consists of
two separate pieces: the computation model and the coordination model. The
computation model allows the programmer to build a single computational unit,
while the coordination model is the glue that binds separate activities into an
ensemble [78]. The tuple space paradigm, based on this idea, offers a flexi-
ble technique to program parallel and distributed systems, by providing the
abstraction of a shared space to which all the processes have access. In this
model, communication between processes is indirect and anonymous as it is
done through the shared (distributed) space. Moreover, data exist in a tuple
space and do not belong to any process. Despite the simplicity of the model,
very few implementations of tuple spaces offer fault tolerant facilities usually
in the form of data replication ([79, 80]), with the drawbacks of space over-
head and consistency maintenance. In this chapter, we consider an extended,
distributed tuple space system with erasure coding capabilities. A tuple to be
inserted in the tuple space is erasure coded and its blocks are placed across the
nodes joining the tuple space group.
Chapter organization First, we study how to distribute the encoded blocks
of single codewords over a large-scale network, in order to decrease the fetch
latency. We do so by designing and evaluating several block placement heuris-
tics, over synthetic and real-world network topologies. Second, we evaluate how
the proposed heuristics behave with respect to data loss when injecting faults
into the topology. Third, we leverage the results of our simulations to identify
two suitable placement strategies that we deploy atop a simple distributed tuple
space system with the aim of evaluating their performance in a practical setting.
This chapter is organized as follows. We survey the related work in Sec-
tion 6.2 and introduce the tuple space paradigm in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4
we describe our block placement heuristics, which we evaluate in Section 6.5.
We leverage the results to drive the prototype implementation described in Sec-
tion 6.6. The implementation supports both erasure coding techniques and a
pluggable mechanism to choose among the different placement strategies. We
test the prototype in Section 6.7 and conclude in Section 6.8.
6.2 Related work
The tuple space coordination model is very appealing for distributed systems
thanks to its space and time decoupling and its synchronization power. Hence,
researchers have tried to add fault tolerance and security to tuple spaces. For ex-
ample, DepSpace [81] is a Byzantine fault tolerant coordination service, which
employs process replication for handling crashes and providing fault tolerance.
An alternative to process replication is block replication, which entails the prob-
lem of block placement.
Block placement policies have been mainly studied in MapReduce contexts,
such as Hadoop [82]. The main purpose of Hadoop data placement policy is
to provide good balance between reliability, write bandwidth, read performance
and load balancing [83]. Placing all replicas on a single node incurs the lowest
50
write bandwidth penalty but lacks redundancy: if the node fails, the data is
lost. On the other hand, placing replicas in different data centres maximizes
redundancy but increases the communication bandwidth.
Hadoop default strategy is to place the first replica on the same node as
the client (for clients running outside the cluster, a node is chosen at random,
although the system tries not to pick nodes that are too full or too busy). The
second replica is placed on a different rack chosen at random. The third replica
goes to the same rack as the second, but on a different node. Further replicas
are placed on random nodes on the cluster, although Hadoop block scheduler
avoids placing too many replicas on the same rack. Our cluster-aware and
distance-aware strategies share some similarity with this approach, in that they
take into account zones of the system that are more sensitive to simultaneous
failures. Several enhancement are introduced in Hadoop with respect to block
placement policies, such as pluggable policies (since v0.21) or guarantees of even
distributions across the cluster (since v0.17). CoHadoop [84] is a lightweight
Hadoop extension that gives applications a fine-grain control of data location.
Similarly, our scheduling policies allow deployers to choose the destination of
the blocks according to different performance criteria.
Adapt [85] mitigates availability heterogeneity issues in non-dedicated dis-
tributed computing environments. Adapt dynamically dispatches data blocks
according to hosts storage capacities. Through simulations, this strategy is
shown to reduce the application runtime by more than 30%, thanks to increased
data locality and reduced data migration cost, though the improvement of per-
formances is less significant for environment with higher network connectivity.
6.3 Tuple spaces in a nutshell
The tuple space paradigm, made popular by Linda [86], is an abstraction of
shared associative memory for parallel and distributed computing. A tuple
space is a repository of tuples that processes can concurrently access via pattern-
matching. Processes create new tuples (out or write operation), test the exis-
tence of a tuple (read operation) and consume a tuple (via the in operation).
The simplicity of this coordination model makes it intuitive and easy to use, also
for distributed applications, making easy the implementation of some synchro-
nization primitives such as semaphores and synchronization barriers [87]. The
tuple space interaction model provides time and space decoupling, in that tuple
producers and consumers remain anonymous with respect to each other [88].
Moreover a tuple has to survive its producer termination, which can be caused
by a node crash or due to the end of the normal execution. In a distributed tuple
space, each node writes tuples in its own local space, but it can read tuples also
from remote ones. For example, in Figure 6.1 node D reads the tuple produced
by node C.
Despite the wide development of tuple space implementations [89], very few
of them offer support for distribution. While some systems use replication to
guarantee data availability [79] or to be resilient to Byzantine faults [80], no
existing system handles link or node faults to guarantee availability of data via
erasure coding. The extensions presented in Section 6.6 fill this gap.
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Figure 6.1: Example of distributed tuple space: each node writes tuples in its
own local tuple space (left) and read tuples from local and remote nodes (right).
6.4 Block placement strategies
In this section, we describe several heuristics for block placement. Data is
stored in the nodes of a graph representing a distributed storage system, using a
standard Reed-Solomon code rs(10,4) for redundancy. The code divides inputs
in 10 blocks, and encodes them into codewords of 14 blocks in such a way that
any 10 encoded blocks are sufficient to recover the original 10. In other words,
this linear code can withstand the loss of any 4 blocks of a codeword. The code
provides the same level of fault-tolerance as 5 times replication while entailing
a storage overhead of 40% only.
In this configuration, from a fault tolerance point of view, it is optimal
to place the 14 blocks of a codeword on units failing independently, such as
geographically remote nodes. In reality, nodes hosted in the same data centre
are more likely to fail or being unreachable at the same time. Indeed there are
several threats that can lead a data centre to a power outage, for example, cyber
attacks, UPS system failures, air conditioner failures and human errors [90].
Thus, the proposed strategies must consider a tradeoff between:
• Latency efficiency : placing blocks apart from each other negatively affects
the fetch latencies;
• Failure resiliency : if related blocks are placed geographically close to each
other, a failure affecting a wide geographical area affects several blocks at
once.
With the aim of experimentally understanding this tradeoff, we study five dif-
ferent placement heuristics. They take into account several structural graph
properties (e.g., the clustering degree) with the objective of minimizing the
latency for fetching blocks.
6.4.1 Round-robin (rr)
The graph is divided into K clusters C1, . . . ,CK using K-means algorithm [91].
Then, the rr strategy places blocks in the clusters in turn. The first block goes
in a random node inside cluster C1, the second block goes in a random node
in cluster C2 and so on. The (K + 1)-th block goes in a random node inside
cluster C1, and the strategy proceeds in this fashion until it places all blocks.
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6.4.2 Degree-proportional (deg)
The deg strategy places more blocks in nodes with higher degree (number of
incident edges). Intuitively, it allows nodes with higher network capacity to
serve more blocks, irrespectively of their geographical location.
6.4.3 Cluster-aware (ca)
The ca strategy places blocks in the cluster hosting the emitting node and
two neighbouring clusters. Using K-means, we divide the graph in K clusters
C1, . . . ,CK. We say that cluster Ci is at distance 1 from cluster Cj if there is an
edge of the graph with source/target in Ci and target/source in Cj . Generally,
we say that clusters Ci and Cj are at distance δ from each other if we must
cross δ − 1 other clusters to go from Ci to Cj and this is the smallest number
possible.
In our simulations, we statically precompute the distances between clusters.
We select the first cluster C to be the cluster containing the emitting node and
two clusters C1 and C2 at distance 1 and 2 from C respectively. Then, we select
at random 8 nodes from C, 4 nodes from C1 and 2 nodes from C2. These nodes
receive the 14 blocks of the codeword. Notice that this heuristic needs at least
3 clusters to work.
6.4.4 Distance-aware (da)
The da strategy takes into account the distance between the emitting node and
the other nodes in the graph. It assumes the knowledge of the diameter dmax of
the graph, and proceeds as follows. First, 3 ranges of node-to-node distances (3
being a parameter of the algorithm) must be fixed: short (from the minimum to
the 33rd percentile of dmax), mid (from the 33rd to the 66th percentile of dmax),
and long from the 66th to dmax.
For each codeword the algorithm selects the emitting node and 7 short-range,
4 mid-range and 2 long-range nodes with respect to the emitting one. The total
14 nodes receive the 14 blocks of the codeword. We report results for 3 ranges
(da3), for 4 ranges (da4, for which the percentiles are 25th, 50th, 70th and the
number of blocks are 6, 4, 2, 1 for each range, respectively) and finally for 5
ranges (da5, using the percentiles 20th, 40th, 60th, 80th and the number of blocks
are 5, 5, 1, 1, 1 for each range respectively).2
6.4.5 Random-Degree (drnd)
This strategy combines a naive random strategy with deg. Each strategy con-
tributes for the placement of half of the blocks.
6.5 Block placement simulation
We present our simulations results with the aim of evaluating how the different
placement strategies perform with respect to fetch latency and data loss.
2We experimentally select the number of blocks assigned to each range to work in practice.
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(a) Random graph, 10 clusters.
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Figure 6.2: Random topology and its blocks distribution.
(a) Scale-free graph, 10 clusters.
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Figure 6.3: Scale-free topology and its blocks distribution.
(a) Cogent graph, 2 clusters.
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Figure 6.4: Cogent topology and its blocks distribution.
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(a) NREN graph, 10 clusters. (b) NREN graph on Europe.
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(c) Blocks distribution.
Figure 6.5: NREN topology and its blocks distribution.
6.5.1 Synthetic and real-world topologies
We start by presenting the topologies we use in our simulations. We consider a
random graph of 1000 nodes, as depicted in Figure 6.2(a), where we highlight
the K = 10 clusters computed by K-means using the Euclidean distance between
nodes. Figure 6.3(a) shows the topology for a scale-free graph of 1000 nodes
built using the preferential attachment method [92]. This topology closely maps
a real Internet topology, yet is simple to study and analyse.
We also consider two real-world topologies. The first, depicted in Fig-
ure 6.4(a), is the Cogent network [93]. It counts 197 nodes and 245 edges
only, nevertheless it spans Europe and USA presenting trans-oceanic links, i.e.,
13 edges connect nodes between Europe and USA. The Full European Nren
network [93], shown in Figure 6.5(b), has 1157 nodes and 1465 edges. When
computing 10 clusters, as in Figure 6.5(a), we observe 1170 inter-cluster edges,
i.e., source and destination nodes belong to different clusters.
As shown in Figures 6.2(a), 6.3(a) and 6.5(a), we fix the number of clusters
to be K = 10 in our simulations, except for Cogent topology which is split inK = 2 clusters corresponding to USA and Europe. Results for ca strategy are not
available for Cogent, since the heuristic requires at least 3 clusters. For Nren
and Cogent, we know the geographical coordinates of the nodes. To take into
account the curvature of the Earth and place more precisely the centroids of the
clusters, we use the Haversine distance [94] as the K-means distance function
for Nren and Cogent networks.
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Figure 6.6: Distance for fetching blocks (lucky node).
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Figure 6.7: Distance for fetching blocks (unlucky node).
6.5.2 Load Balancing
We study how the strategies spread blocks on the four different graph topologies.
In Figures 6.2(b), 6.3(b), 6.4(b) and 6.5(c) the x axis represents the number of
blocks per node, say it b. On the y axis, we display the number of nodes hosting
b blocks, for 0 ≤ b ≤ 100. For Cogent, we have 100 ≤ b ≤ 400 as the graph
comprises 197 nodes only, while we distribute the same amount of data blocks.
The rnd strategy produces a Gaussian distribution on the random graph,
and we observe that on the scale-free graph deg and drnd give rise to a long-tail
block distribution, i.e., several nodes host few blocks while few nodes store plenty
of blocks. As an empirical confirmation that scale-free graphs are well-suited for
representing Internet topologies, we highlight the similarity between the block
distributions of the scale-free graph and the NREN network, in Figures 6.3(b)
and 6.5(c) respectively. Overall, block distributions generated by the da and rr
strategies tend to be bell-shaped, while dar and deg entail left-sided pick and
long tail.
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6.5.3 Fetching latency
We continue by evaluating how the proposed strategies differ in terms of block
recovery latency, as observed by the clients wishing to reconstruct matching
tuples. We assume that the fetch latency is proportional to the distance between
nodes. Hence, we measure the length of the minimum paths between the node
hosting the target block and the client.
We observe that a node storing a consistent amount of blocks necessarily
needs to fetch only few ones to reconstruct tuples. Hence, for each topology and
each placement heuristic, we distinguish 3 types of clients based on the number
of blocks they store. The lucky and the unlucky node store the greatest and the
smallest amount of blocks respectively.
We use a representation based on stacked percentiles throughout the re-
minder of this section. The white bar at the bottom represents the minimum
value, the pale grey on top the maximal value. Intermediate shades of grey
represent the 25th, 50th – the median – and 75th percentiles. We compare the
results against a baseline rnd strategy that randomly places blocks across the
graph. Figures 6.6 and 6.7 present the results for the lucky and unlucky node
respectively, which validate the intuition that the number of blocks the client
is storing greatly affects the observed fetch latency. For instance, da3 performs
better than the other heuristics in 3 out of 4 topologies when the client is lucky.
However, this is not the case for the unlucky case, where deg and rr perform
better instead. These observations suggest that no strategy wins in all possible
topologies, and that deployers need to carefully consider the different tradeoffs
for their applications and workloads.
6.5.4 Fetching latency under faults
We perform the same set of experiments as in Section 6.5.3, injecting faults into
the graph. For each graph, we select the most populated among the 10 clusters
and we crash 1% of its nodes. This setting simulates a catastrophic event occur-
ring to nodes geographically close to each other. Once the faults are injected,
we let the lucky node, see Figure 6.8, and the unlucky node, see Figure 6.9,
trigger the reconstruction of all the data stored. During these simulations, we
do not observe any data loss. Hence, the heuristics spread blocks sufficiently
apart from each other to tolerate crashes within the same cluster.
However, when injecting faults the fetch latency highly depends on the par-
ticular failing nodes. In the case of the Cogent topology, the deg strategy greatly
improves the results produced by the rnd placement, while on the scale-free
graph performance degrades for the unlucky client. The da3 strategy outper-
forms the other heuristics in the Nren topology. In general, distance-aware
heuristics seem to be well-suited for the random graph.
6.5.5 Simulation summary
Finally, to evaluate the statistical significance of the differences recorded by the
simulations between the various heuristics, we perform two sets of t-tests [91]
on fault-free graphs. First, we build the dataset of cumulative distances. For
each node c, we compute the cumulative distance, that is, the sum of the length
of all minimum paths covered to retrieve all the data in the system from that
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Figure 6.8: 1% crashes in one cluster, lucky node.
particular client c. We fix a topology and compare different heuristics against
each other. We find the following p-values:
scale-free graph random graph Nren Cogent
t.test(rnd,deg) 0.2486 0.03055 0.00761 0.7828
t.test(rnd,da3) 0.4805 0.3242 0.3774 0.2203
These p-values answer the question: "What is the probability that the means of
the cumulative distances covered by the two heuristics are equal?". For every
graph we find a strategy between da3 and deg such that the probability is less
the 25%. We consider this a low evidence that the two means are the same, but
still such a value does not provide a decisive response.
For this reason, we further create a dataset of the distances covered to fetch
every block by each node in the graph. In the case of the scale-free graph
the dataset has 1000 entries times the number of blocks fetched, i.e., 3276000
entries. We run t-tests on random 1000-entries-samples from this dataset to
compare different heuristics against each other. We find the following p-values:
scale-free graph random graph Nren Cogent
t.test(rnd,deg) 0.1661 6 ⋅ 10−6 0.0004 0.6475
t.test(rnd,da3) 0.4215 0.0406 0.2936 0.1042
For every topology, we can find a strategy between deg and da3 with support
less than 16% for the hypothesis that the distance covered is the same as the one
covered when rand is used. We take into account the modelling and statistical
results to select deg and da3 for implementation in a real tuple space, which we
use to evaluate their performance in a practical setting.
6.6 Implementation
We implement and deploy three of the described block placement strategies (da3,
deg and rnd) atop SimpleTS,3 a tuple space implemented in Python (v3.4.0).
3https://github.com/jmbjorndalen/SimpleTS
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Figure 6.9: 1% crashes in one cluster, unlucky node.
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Figure 6.10: Distributed tuple space endowed with erasure coding: write oper-
ations spread blocks apart driven by a specific strategy; read operations fetch
blocks from remote nodes.
The original implementation of SimpleTS does not support remote tuple space
nodes. Therefore, we extend it to support a distributed scenario, leveraging
Pyro (v4.0),4 a remoting library for Python. Overall, our modifications to the
SimpleTS source code consist of 250 additional lines of code.
To add erasure coding and block placement techniques, we extend the tuple
space APIs with additional operations to properly handle writing, reading, and
deletion of encoded tuples. For example, using a rs(10,4), the out(t) operation
that emits the tuple t in the tuple space, becomes out_ec(t). This version
encodes the tuple, splits it into 14 blocks and, according to the chosen strategy,
distributes these blocks among the other nodes. To this end, from the original
tuple a list of tuples of the following form is created:
<tupleUID, blocksAndIndicesList, nodeList>
where blocksAndIndicesList is a list of pairs (bi, i) indicating that bi is the
i-th block of the codeword, tupleUID is a unique identifier of the original tuple
t, and nodeList is a list of nodes containing the remaining blocks. Figure 6.10
shows the extended version of SimpleTS with erasure coding abilities.
4https://pythonhosted.org/Pyro4/
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Reading a tuple only requires to fetch 10 out of the 14 existing blocks. The
tuple space programming paradigm requires the reading operations to operate
via pattern-matching [86] and in the case of encoded tuples, the tuple space
needs to decode the tuple. Therefore, this operation sequentially reads the tuples
from the tuple space and checks whether the reconstructed tuple matches the
template. Specifically, it leverages the nodeList index to discover and retrieve
the missing blocks from other nodes in order to reconstruct the tuple. Clearly,
in the worst case, to find a matching tuple the system has to decode the entire
tuple space. We assume the existence of an up-to-date indexing service that
serves the purpose of speeding up the process of discovering the location of the
required blocks. In our evaluation, we assume to know the location of the nodes
storing the blocks required to decode the tuple.
We implement both da3 and deg strategies on our tuple space and test
them on a scale-free network of 100 nodes. We emulate a large-scale network
deployment using Docker (v1.13.1). We map each SimpleTS node (with its
local tuple space) to a standalone container. The latency between two nodes,
say i and j, is proportional to their minimum distance on the graph. Latency
(by mean of a sleep system call) is then interposed by the proxy interface of
the Pyro service exposed by each tuple space process. In practice, when node i
contacts node j to read (or write) a tuple, node j sleeps latencyi,j milliseconds
before replying. An alternative method is to add latency at the OS level, e.g.,
by implementing a software router.5
6.7 Prototype evaluation
We present our evaluation of the extended SimpleTS system. Due to the lack
of hardware resources, we are limited to a cluster of 100 nodes mimicking a
scale-free network. Each node is executed by a SimpleTS Docker container,
and only communication delays among nodes are emulated.
6.7.1 Erasure coding overhead
To evaluate the overhead of erasure coding, we execute an initial set of mi-
crobenchmarks for reading times. In this experiment, we vary the size of data
stored in each tuple, from 1 byte to 512KB. At the beginning, we randomly dis-
tribute 1000 tuples across 100 nodes. Then, 10 random nodes read all the 1000
tuples, and we report the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the read-
ing time. In Figure 6.11(a), the size of the tuple modestly affects the reading
time with respect to the tuple space without erasure coding.
When erasure coding is enabled, see Figure 6.11(b), the reading time is more
sensitive to the tuple size: it grows from milliseconds for 1 byte tuples to several
seconds for 512KB tuples. For bigger tuples, the time for encoding and decoding
is significantly higher. A highly optimized erasure coding library, such as Intel
ISA-L [95], would greatly reduce the overhead and make it more practical.
5 We report on our failed attempt in using Linux tc’s traffic shaping (using delay.sh
https://gist.github.com/arr2036/6598137) to emulate network latencies. In particular, the
current Docker networking layer does not cope well with this approach, where all nodes in a
given network class (such as all the Docker containers running in the same host) apply the
same delay, preventing the emulation of more complex graph topologies.
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Figure 6.11: Tuple reading performance for increasing tuple sizes.
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Figure 6.12: Times for different strategies of blocks placement.
6.7.2 Experiments with different strategies
This experiment evaluates the performances of the tuple space using different
block placement strategies. At the beginning, each of the 100 nodes writes 10
tuples. The tuples are encoded and split into blocks. Those are dispatched to
remote nodes according to the given strategy. Finally, a node is chosen to fetch
and read the blocks of its own tuples. Figure 6.12 presents our results for write
and read operations.6 We plot the CDF of the timings to write/read the tuples
into/from the tuple space respectively in Figures 6.12(a) and 6.12(b). The da3
strategy achieves the best performances for writes, as the writing time depends
on the number of nodes used to spread tuple blocks. Random placement offers
the worst performance because it involves a large number of nodes.
The first read is accomplished faster when blocks are distributed with rnd
strategy. But under this strategy, the overall reading time is the longest (almost
15 seconds). Under the deg strategy we take almost 6 seconds to read the first
block but the global job is concluded in less than 3 seconds. In our experiment,
the most performant read is obtained when blocks are placed with da3 strategy:
we take less than 2 seconds to read the first block and conclude the job in around
4 seconds.
6We omit the results for the withdrawing operation. The trend is similar to the read results
with a small overhead due to the fetching of all the 14 blocks.
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6.8 Summary
The problem of block placement in a wide-area network setting is of paramount
importance, but several distributed applications rely on a random strategy. We
present a study of several block placement heuristics to dispatch blocks over the
nodes of a distributed storage system. In particular, we consider a distributed
application implemented via the tuple space paradigm, which we endow with
erasure coding capabilities to efficiently cope with network faults, while be-
ing storage efficient and allowing fast fetching time. We extend an open-source
Python-based tuple space implementation with distribution capabilities and era-
sure coding features.
We evaluate our block placement heuristics over synthetic and real-world
graph topologies, up to thousands of nodes. The results of the simulations to-
gether with the prototype evaluation reinforce the belief that it is important
to gather structural information about the network topology underlying a dis-
tributed storage system and select the block placement strategy accordingly.
In this chapter, we considered the distributed tuple space as practical use-
case. We stress that our strategies are general purpose and can be deployed in
other distributed systems, such as distributed key-value stores.
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Chapter 7
Recast: Random
Entanglement for
Censorship-resistant Archival
STorage
7.1 Introduction
Users entrust an increasing number of documents to online cloud systems for
long-term archival purposes. When archiving some content, users wish for their
content to remain available and readily accessible at any time. Hence, an
archival system must be highly durable. There are many threats to durabil-
ity, and the longer the lifetime of some content, the worse it gets.
Broadly speaking, one can distinguish between passive threats (e.g., hard-
ware failures) and active threats (e.g., a censor wishing to delete a specific
document). A common countermeasure to mitigate passive threats is redun-
dancy: extra information is stored in the system, with the goal of tolerating
node or disk failures. On the other hand, effectively defending against active
attacks still presents open challenges. Various solutions have been proposed,
none of which is fully satisfactory. For example, security by obscurity [96, 97]
encrypts content before archival so that the attacker cannot distinguish the data
to censor, but this severely limits the operation that can be performed on data
and the way it can be accessed or shared. Data entanglement [98, 99] attempts
to weave together popular and unpopular data so that an attacker is forced to
do collateral damage when censoring its target, but in a way that is unfit for
deployment in practical systems.
We introduce Recast, an anti-censorship data archival system based on
a random data entanglement strategy proposed in [71] that provides strong
guarantees while being readily applicable to real systems. Recast’s design and
entanglement principles are based around the following intuition: by entangling
pieces of data with one another, we enable potentially unpopular and rarely
accessed content to benefit from the protection offered to other data in the
system. Second, the asymmetry of the construction makes the system easy to
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repair and hard to corrupt. While the randomness component of Recast’s
entanglement makes it NP-hard to compute the minimal set of documents to be
deleted to censor a target [71], error-correcting codes allow to repair the system
recursively as long as the damage done by the attacker is recoverable.
To assess the security of Recast, we assume a powerful adversary model
where the censor has access to the metadata and thus knows how documents
are processed, split, and distributed over the storage nodes. To further protect
the system against a powerful attacker targeting metadata, Recast includes
an emergency disaster recovery mechanism that enables the system to rebuild
metadata from the data itself.
We measure the protection by collateral damage units, that is, the number
of additional documents to be deleted by a censor when targeting a specific
document. In that respect, we design Recast so as to offer strong long-term
as well as fast short-term protection. We first build upon uniform data entan-
glement [71], which offers very strong long-term protection but leaves recently
archived documents poorly protected. To address this limitation, we rely on nor-
mal data entanglement and temporary replication that provide fast short-term
protection, but do not spread entanglement adequately across the archive. To
get the best of both worlds, we introduce a hybrid approach, nu-entanglement,
which exploits the strong long-term protection of uniform entanglement and the
fast short-term protection of normal entanglement and temporary replication.
The rest of the chapter adopts the notation summarized in Table 7.2 and
is organized as follows. We summarize our design goals in Section 7.2. Sec-
tion 7.3 surveys similarities and differences with state-of-the-art censorship-
resistant archival systems. In Section 7.4 we briefly recall entanglement and
the STeP-archival strategy, and we refer to Section 4.6 for a more complete
introduction. In Section 7.5 we propose a new practical technique to data en-
tanglement, called nu-entanglement, which offers fast short-term and strong
long-term protection for all the documents in the archive. We evaluate Recast
security in Section 7.6 and we conclude in Section 7.7.
7.2 Design goal
In this chapter, we aim at designing a long-term censorship-resistant system en-
suring content integrity and durability. We understand durability as the ability
to eventually retrieve any of the archived documents, see Section 4.2.
While high availability and confidentiality of data are desirable features of
any storage solution, durability is paramount to long-term archival systems.
Indeed, maintaining high availability may get expensive over time for docu-
ments that are infrequently accessed. Moreover, maintaining data confidential-
ity and managing the associated encryption keys over a long period of time
(e.g. decades) unnecessarily exposes the system as a central point of failure.
With time, encryption algorithms are broken and keys once considered large
enough prove to be too short. Therefore confidentiality is best left deferred to
the client’s discretion. In contrast, the ability to retrieve documents for audit
purposes or disaster recovery at a configurable cost answers a more practical
need, especially in a context where independent providers operating as storage
backends may become unreliable over time or worse, may attempt to censor,
tamper or delete user content.
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To address this problem, Recast allows to store and retrieve documents en-
suring their durability by establishing random document interdependency links,
which enable recursive reconstruction of data beyond the local capability of the
underlying erasure code. The tradeoff is that documents cannot be updated nor
deleted from the archive. A file update must consist in a new file upload, and
we do not offer file removal as enabling this operation for a user would enable
it for the censor as well. This means that a system administrator compelled by
law to remove content [100] must work as hard as an attacker who wishes to
censor a file without causing collateral damage, i.e., recode the entire system
starting from the file to delete. For completeness, we investigate the (huge) cost
of this operation in our evaluation (see Section 7.6, document removal micro-
benchmark).
7.3 Related work
The problem of anti-censorship for digital data has been first explored in [101]
and subsequently extensively studied in e.g. [96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103]. We can
broadly distinguish between three main approaches: (i) replication to protect
against a censor compromising a small number of servers [101], (ii) anonymity
of the user to hide his identity and/or of the content to hide its location [96, 97],
(iii) entanglement to prevent an attacker from deleting a single target document
without causing collateral damage [98, 99].
To prevent censorship a system must detect that data has been compromised
and be able to repair it if needed. While tamper detection is a basic feature of-
fered by all censorship-resistant systems, data reconstruction has received much
less attention: it is either not supported by the system [98] or implemented triv-
ially by fetching a fresh replica of the corrupted data [96, 99, 102], assuming one
exists. On the contrary, Recast offers a powerful recursive data reconstruction
method, as explained in Section 4.6.
In the remainder of this section, we survey the systems that directly offer
storage-based anti-censorship properties, synthetically presented in Table 7.1.
Dagster [98] is a censorship-resistant publishing system. It uses an anony-
mous channel between data publishers/consumers and the servers. For each
b-bits block of the original document, it stores the block encrypted and XORed
with c old blocks from the pool of archived blocks. Such newly created block to-
gether with the c old blocks form a codeword. The original block can be locally
retrieved (from the codeword) only if all blocks of the codeword are available.
Similar to Recast, the size b of blocks and the number of entangled blocks c
can be configured but Recast offers a much wider choice for coding parameters,
thus enabling greater fault tolerance. Encryption guarantees server deniability
only, as the encryption keys are stored in clear in the Dagster resource locator.
Similarly, Tangler [99] allows users to publish a set of documents anony-
mously. It uses a naming convention and a public/private key pair that ensure
that only the owner can update his own data. Each document block is entangled
with exactly 2 old blocks β1, β2 using (3,4)-Shamir secret sharing [112]. The
two parity blocks in output p1, p2 are then stored in the system. The owner
distributes p1 and p2 (as well as the old blocks β1 and β2 used for entanglement),
thus replicating other documents. Any three of these blocks can be used to re-
construct the original document. In contrast, Recast provides a more flexible
65
T
yp
e
A
no
ny
m
ou
s
up
lo
ad
A
no
ny
m
ou
s
do
w
nl
oa
d
Se
rv
er
de
ni
ab
ili
ty
Fa
ul
t
to
le
ra
nt
C
ac
hi
ng
O
pe
n
so
ur
ce
R
E
ST
A
P
I
(p
ut
/g
et
)
Su
pp
or
t
fo
r
up
da
te
Su
pp
or
t
fo
r
de
le
te
R
ec
ur
si
ve
re
pa
ir
Dagster [98] (iii) 3 3 3 7 7 7 3 7 7 7
DeepStore [104] (i) 7 7 3 3 7 7 3 7 7 7
FreeHaven [97] (ii) 3 3 3 3 7 7 3 7 7 7
Freenet [102, 105] (i) 3 3 3 3 3 [106] 3 7 3 7
OceanStore [107] (i) 7 7 3 3 3 [108] 3 3 7 7
Potshards [109] (i) 7 7 3 3 7 7 3 7 7 7
Publius [96] (ii) 3 7 3 3 7 [110] 3 3 3 7
SafeStore [103] (i) 7 7 7 3 3 7 3 3 3 7
Tangler [99] (iii) ● ● 7 3 7 7 3 3 7 7
Recast (iii) 7 7 3 3 7 [111] 3 7 7 3
Table 7.1: Censorship-resistant systems. All provide tamper-evidence features.●=missing details.
scheme where the number of blocks required to retrieve a document depends on
the configuration of the entanglement code in use.
Freenet [102, 105] is an anonymizing and censorship-resistant distributed
storage system. To guarantee file anonymity, nodes know only their neighbours
in the chain of queries, ignoring their specific role (producer/consumer of the
file). Freenet lacks permanent storage guarantees: the least recently used files
are deleted from a node’s datastore when the arrival of a new file causes the
datastore to exceed the designated size, which is configurable by the Freenet
node operator. Recast on the other hand is designed to store documents
indefinitely, making it prohibitively difficult to delete a single document. Freenet
places multiple copies of the same document across the nodes overlay, according
to their popularity. A censor must target all those copies to permanently delete
a document. Recastmakes it very hard for a censor to delete a single document
without affecting a large portion of the archive.
FreeHaven [97] is an anonymous publishing system enabling users to as-
sociate an expiration time to documents, similarly to Comet [113]. It embeds a
reputation system that relies on the capacity of nodes to store documents until
their expiration. In contrast, Recast assumes to always have sufficient storage
capacity, and documents never vanish. Moreover, Recast is not intended to
provide anonymity, an orthogonal concern to be handled by upper layers.
Publius [96] encrypts and spreads documents over a set of (static) servers.
The data encryption key is secret-shared among k of the n servers using (k,n)-
Shamir secret sharing. Each server hosts the encrypted Publius content and
a share of the key. The content can be tamper-checked because it is crypto-
graphically tied to the Publius address: any modification of one of these two
components causes the tamper check to fail. Recast implements tamper-checks
by exploiting decoding in document reads: if any block is corrupted, then the
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decoding fails and reconstruction is triggered.
Mnemosyne [114] is a steganographic peer-to-peer storage system. Nodes
are continuously filled with random data. Upon archival of a real document,
its content is encrypted and made indistinguishable from the random substrate,
preventing an attacker to determine the existence of a file and ensuring privacy
and deniability of the content itself. As in Publius, data is spread across
nodes [115] mainly for resiliency and each of the nodes is unaware of the other
nodes holding parts of the file. Recast tolerates a stronger threat model where
storage nodes have access to metadata information.
OceanStore [107] is a persistent data store on top of an untrusted infras-
tructure. It uses promiscuous caching (data is cached everywhere and at any
time) to enhance locality and availability. This solution relies on classic erasure
coding techniques, specifically a Cauchy Reed-Solomon code of length 32 and
dimension 16, see Section 2.1, to ensure durability.
DeepStore [104] is a large-scale archival system for immutable data. It
achieves a good efficiency/redundancy compromise by applying compression
with inter-file dependencies and replicating the most valuable pieces of com-
pressed information. DeepStore relies on the Presidio framework [116] to
implement hybrid compression across heterogeneous data, as well as deduplica-
tion to eliminate redundant data.
Lockss [117] is an archival system based on a voting protocol. The opinion
pools provide system peers with confidence in content authenticity and integrity.
Moreover, content is replicated among peers and replicas are regularly audited
to promptly repair any damage. Recast implements temporary replication to
protect recently inserted documents and uses an auditing subsystem to remove
temporary replicas from the system as soon as blocks are sufficiently entangled.
SafeStore [103] is a distributed storage system offering long-term data
durability. It exploits an aggressive isolation scheme across multiple storage
service providers. It uses an informed hierarchical erasure code that maximizes
data durability and provides redundancy in the fault-isolated domains. De-
pending on the code’s parameters, a certain number of faults can be recovered
in each fault-isolated domain and an auditing subsystem further monitors data
loss and triggers reconstruction. Recast and Safestore sit on opposite sides
from an architectural point of view: while Recast uses entanglement, Safe-
Store exploits aggressive isolation, which leads to high durability but does not
offer strong resilience against an active censor.
Percival [118] and Potshards [109] are two systems relying on secret-
splitting techniques. The latter offers long-term security by using two levels
of secret splitting and placement. The first level provides secrecy by XORing
content with random data. It produces n fragments using (k,n)-Shamir secret
sharing and places them into shards for availability. Shards retrieval is based
on indexes accessible by all users, in a similar manner to Recast’s metadata
indexes. Potshards uses approximate pointers to allow for quick reconstruc-
tion of user data without the need of external information, similar to Recast’s
emergency recovery procedure.
Finally, the design of Recast is based on STeP-archival [71]. STeP-archival
is the theoretical foundation of Recast and provides tools such as greedy attack
heuristics and recursive reconstruction that we exploit in this chapter. We
elaborate on such a base to build a practical STeP-archive. In practice, we
overcome the poor short term protection of the uniform random entanglement
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u uniform entanglement
n normal entanglement with standard deviation σ = 1000
nσ normal entanglement with standard deviation σ
nu normal-uniform entanglement with standard deviation σ = 1000
nuσ normal-uniform entanglement with standard deviation σ
l leaping attack
c creeping attack
rα level of temporary replication α
Table 7.2: Notation. E.g., we write u-l-(s,t,e,p)-rα for the leaping attack
running on a (s, t, e, p)-archive with uniform entanglement and keeping α tem-
porary copies for each document in the tail of the archive. The replication
parameter is omitted when temporary replication is not in place.
studied in [71] by developing new entanglement heuristics. Section 4.6 presents
STeP-archival in greater details and for its centrality in this chapter we recall
its main parameters in Section 7.4.
7.4 STeP-archival
We briefly recall STeP-archival introduced in Section 4.6. A (s, t, e, p)-archive
is a storage system where each archived document consists of a codeword of s
source blocks, t pointers or tangled blocks, p parity blocks, and that can correct
e = p− s erasures per codeword. The document to be archived is split into s ≥ 1
source blocks. From the archive, t distinct old blocks, the pointers, are selected
and a rs(s + t,p) code is used to create p ≥ s parity blocks depending on both
source blocks and pointers. Finally, we only archive the p parity blocks.
To fully characterize the STeP-archive we have to choose a pointer selection
strategy. Different flavours of entanglement are studied in [71]. In particular,
uniform random entanglement selects pointer blocks uniformly at random. The
randomness of this approach is an advantage as pre-planning an attack against
such a structure is not feasible. Uniform entanglement has the main drawback
of requiring increasingly longer periods of time to protect young documents as
the archive increases. For example, Figure 7.1 shows that after inserting 10000
documents, 25% of them are either not pointed to or pointed to only once. An
attacker wishing to tamper with these documents can thus do so without causing
collateral damage. The authors of [71] also show how to speed up the protection
of new documents by selecting the pointer blocks from a sliding window bounded
to the recent past, although this has the drawback to bound the entanglement
level of the documents in the archive.
7.5 Hybrid entanglement
In this section, we leverage the benefits of the uniform and window entanglement
strategies. We present a hybrid entanglement technique mixing pointers chosen
accordingly to a uniform and a normal distribution. We further enhance anti-
censorship for recently archived documents using temporary replication.
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Figure 7.1: Variation of number of pointers to each document in a u-(1,5,2,3)-
archive with 104 documents. At the end, the 25% of documents is pointed to at
most once, hence not protected by entanglement. Notation in Table 7.2.
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Figure 7.2: Variation of number of pointers to each document in a n-(1,5,2,3)-
archive with 104 documents. Normal entanglement evenly spreads the protec-
tion among documents: at the end the 50% of documents have between 5 and
9 pointers.
7.5.1 Normal entanglement
To archive document di+1, we extract t pointer blocks from a left half-normal
distribution with standard deviation σ centred in the last archived document
di. This models a sliding window of about size 2σ, in which the probability
to point to a document older than di−2σ is 5%, and the probability to point
to a document older than di−3σ is 0.3%. On the one hand, this means that
documents are quickly protected: we just need to wait for 2σ documents to
reach the average protection offered by the archive. Furthermore, this does not
depend on the size of the archive but only on the chosen standard deviation σ.
Comparing Figures 7.1 and 7.2 we see that the first quartile (25%) grows from
pointed to at most once under uniform entanglement, to pointed to at most
three under normal entanglement.
As discussed in the previous section, approximating a sliding window bounds
the propagation of the entanglement. In particular, the creeping attack de-
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Figure 7.3: Number of corrupted documents to erase a target (x-axis) with a
creeping attack in a n-(1, t,2,3)-archive for t = 3,4,5,10. Notation in Table 7.2.
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Figure 7.4: Number of corrupted documents to erase a target (x-axis) with a
leaping attack in a nu-(1, t,2,3)-archive with t = 3,4,5,10.
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
d 8
60
00
d 9
20
00
0
d 9
98
00
0
# 
de
st
ro
ye
d 
do
cu
m
en
ts
index target document (x100000)
u-l n-c nu-l
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nu-entangled (1,5,2,3)-archives.
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scribed in Section 4.6 is very effective. To confirm this intuition, we simulate
the creeping attack on an archive storing 106 documents: as expected, the aver-
age number of documents to be censored, i.e., the protection, is constant through
the archive and only the last 2000 documents have lower protection (Figure 7.3,
right-most side of the x-axis). As expected, increasing the number of pointers t
improves the average protection against the creeping attack: in Figure 7.3 the
average number of documents to be destroyed to censor the target is about 506
for t = 3, 758 for t = 4, 835 for t = 5 and 935 for t = 10.
7.5.2 Hybrid nu-entanglement
To overcome the limitations of the described entanglement techniques, we blend
normal and uniform entanglement together. We select each of t pointers by
flipping a coin, so that with probability 1
2
we have:
• a uniform pointer, providing the good randomness and the strong long-
term protection of uniform entanglement,
• a normal pointer, offering the fast short-term protection of normal entan-
glement.
The best greedy heuristic on a STeP-archive with nu-entanglement is the
leaping attack described in Section 4.6. Indeed the effectiveness of the creeping
attack drops thanks to the restored randomness. In Figure 7.4, we observe a
greater influence of the number of pointer blocks on the protection. In particular
for t = 5, the long-term protection grows by almost 3 orders of magnitude with
respect to normal entanglement and the short term-protection grows by about
2 orders of magnitude with respect to uniform entanglement.
We compare the three entanglement methods in Figure 7.5 over an archive of
106 documents. Using uniform entanglement, around 6 ⋅ 105 documents can be
censored tampering with only 10 documents. On the other hand, using normal
entanglement with σ = 1000, all the documents have the same protection except
for the last 2σ = 2000 documents. Moreover, when normal entanglement is in
place, protection is offered fast: to erase d998000 (a recent one), a greedy attacker
needs to tamper with more than 800 documents. In contrast, using uniform
entanglement, d998000 can be censored by tampering with one document. As
discussed, nu-entanglement mixes the two approaches to gain the best of both
worlds: nu-entanglement offers greater protection than uniform entanglement
for all the documents older than document d86000 and greater than normal
entanglement up to document d920000. Hence, nu-entanglement outperforms
the other entanglement approaches on more than the 80% of the archive when
tested with suboptimal greedy attacks.
7.5.3 Temporary replication
Regardless of the pointers selection method, entanglement takes time to provide
protection to new documents (e.g., the last archived document is not pointed
to). Hence, we use temporary replication until the entanglement kicks-in. The
replicas are spread over the various storage nodes and enable fast recovery in
case of node failure, at the cost of increased storage overhead. To reduce such
costs, we periodically examine the level of protection of blocks and once a given
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Figure 7.6: Backtracking the creeping attack on a n100-(1,5,2,3)-archive of
1000 documents.
threshold is passed, Recast removes the corresponding replicas from the storage
nodes.
In the remainder of this section we study how to set such a threshold in
a STeP-archive configured with nu-entanglement. We conduct this study by
means of simulations, in order to establish when a given block’s replicas can be
safely removed. For uniform entanglement, as the number of blocks increases
over time, the random selection of pointers lowers the probability of picking
recent ones. Hence the replication level and the replication threshold are de-
termined by the normal pointers. On a normally-entangled STeP-archive with
1000 documents, we run the creeping attack to get a first estimate, then we
backtrack the tree of solutions to find the optimal one, exploiting branch prun-
ing [71] to speed up the execution time. We present the results in Figure 7.6.
The average protection offered by t = 5 normal pointers selected with standard
deviation σ = 100 is 21.8. It drops with the 800th document, i.e., 2σ documents
before the end of the archive. The average number of documents to be deleted is
8.2 on the full archive and 11.6 out of the tail. Hence to guarantee homogeneous
protection to a Recast system that uses a STeP-archive with t = 10 nu-pointers
when the normal pointers are extracted with standard deviation σ = 100, we de-
cide to replicate the tail, i.e., 2σ documents, 10 times each. We evaluate the
failure resilience of this archive in Section 7.6.3.
7.5.4 Summary
Uniform entanglement provides strong long-term protection but needs a massive
use of replication to reach an adequate level of short-term protection. To reduce
the storage overhead, we study normal entanglement which provides constant
long-term protection, fast short-term protection and a level of replication in-
dependent on the size of the archive. While the cost of replicas grows linearly
with the size of the archive when using uniform entanglement, it goes to zero
in the case of normal entanglement. Indeed, as the number of documents that
need to be replicated is constant, in the long-term it becomes a negligible frac-
tion of the whole archive. Finally, we present nu-entanglement that blends the
two approaches to attain strong long-term protection via uniform pointers and
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uments. For each different STeP configuration (different fill pattern), we delete
d0 (the root of the history) and three other documents d100000 (old), d500000
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fast short-term protection with a constant amount of temporary replication via
normal pointers.
7.6 Evaluation
We evaluate Recast’s resilience to data loss, against active and passive adver-
saries. We also assess the cost of a document removal, which is, nevertheless,
not offered as a functionality of Recast, as discussed in Section 7.2.
7.6.1 Micro-benchmark: document removal
In Figure 7.7, we study the bandwidth cost to actually "delete" a document
from the archive. In practice, the deletion of a target document is a three phase
process: finding a (possibly minimal) complete set S of documents entangled
with the target, decoding the documents in S and re-encoding these documents
with other pointers.
The more accurate the first step is, the less expensive the actual deletion is.
For this experiment, we compute the number of documents in the set S from the
results shown in Figure 7.5. The cost of the last two steps depends on the RS
code used in the STeP-archive: in Figure 7.7 we present results for a (1,5,2,3)-
archive with different entanglement strategies. The block size corresponds to
the document size (1kB in the plot) and we compute 3 parity blocks out of
the source and pointers using a rs(6,3) code. Hence decoding and re-encoding
require fetching 6 and sending 3 blocks per document respectively (the source
is not stored and the pointers to re-encode are chosen from the archive itself).
The constant bandwidth required for normal entanglement is determined by the
constant protection offered to documents. When using nu-entanglement on an
archive of 1kB documents, erasing d100000 and d500000 from the archive requires
the transfer of 2.7 GB and 0.55 GB respectively.
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Figure 7.8: File availability as dependent on disk failures (on the left) using a
certain storage space (on the right).
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Figure 7.9: File availability as dependent on disk failures with and without
temporary replication.
7.6.2 Macro-benchmark: passive attacks
We now evaluate the resilience of Recast to passive attacks. We put under the
label of passive attacks all threats to the system that neither leverage particular
knowledge nor privileged access to it, e.g., nodes crashes or unavailable nodes
for maintenance.
To evaluate the data loss Recast undergoes when nodes fail we instrument
simulations in the Internet Archive scenario proposed for the evaluation of Deep-
Store [119]. For the sake of comparison, we simulate Recast with 188 nodes
storing 196664 documents and we assume that the original data is compressed
with the Lempel-Ziv (LZ) algorithm before archiving. We evaluate data avail-
ability after failures and storage space, respectively on Figure 7.8 left and right.
In particular, we use two configurations for STeP with different storage over-
heads, namely 200% and a lighter 50%. The results show how parameters highly
impact the system reliability in the passive attacker scenario and well prove the
resistance of Recast against random node failures: with a light-storage config-
uration, in the catastrophic event of about 13% of disks failing simultaneously,
the data loss is less than 0.25%.
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Figure 7.10: Number of corrupted documents to erase a target (x-axis) in a
nu-(1,5,2,3)-archive with 104 documents. We explore an increasing number (as
indicated in the legend) of partial solutions at each step of the leaping attack.
In Figure 7.9, we evaluate the availability when introducing temporary repli-
cation. We simulate Recast with 50 nodes storing 50000 documents, and con-
figured with a (1,10,2,3)-archive with standard deviation σ = 100. We simulate
such system both without replication and by replicating the youngest 300 docu-
ments 10 times each. We randomly erase between 8% and 48% of nodes (x-axis),
we trigger recursive reconstruction and record the percentage of available doc-
uments. We notice that temporary replication becomes useful when more than
the 15% of disks fail, that is, in a non-catastrophic scenario the availability of
the Recast-archived documents is guaranteed by the nu-entanglement itself.
7.6.3 Macro-benchmark: active attacks
We move now to the evaluation of Recast resiliency against an active attacker,
i.e., an attacker that knows the metadata describing the system, has access to all
its node and pro-actively exploits these abilities. We simulate such a powerful
attacker via greedy heuristics which, as mentioned, are suboptimal. We improve
them by exploring many partial solutions in the intermediate steps of the leap-
ing attack. In practice, we perform much costlier computations which better
approximate the unknown optimal solution. We show how the set of blocks
to be deleted gets smaller in Figure 7.10. For the first document archived, in-
creasing from 1 to 500 partial solutions at each step leads to an insignificant
improvement (from 4704 to 4662) in the number of documents to be destroyed.
Small improvements also apply to the tail of the archive. Opposite, the number
of documents to be tampered to censor d2000 drops from 1359 to 601. Neverthe-
less, it should be noted that to halve the number of documents to be erased we
multiplied by 500 the number of solutions that we expand and explore at every
step. We also note that for the tail of the archive, it is sufficient to explore 10
solutions at each step of the greedy algorithm, while for the rest of the archive,
in our simulation, a buffer size of 100 guarantees that the order of magnitude
of the collateral damage is stable.
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7.7 Summary
Archival systems are designed to support long-term storage of documents. As
we turn into a “digital society”, these systems become increasingly important.
Archival storage can leverage the same mechanisms that classical data stores
use, notably cryptography and redundancy, to protect against common types
of attacks. It should however be resilient against more subtle attacks that
would threaten the long-term integrity of the archived data, in particular offering
strong protection against attackers that covertly tamper with the data or delete
specific documents (i.e., censors).
In this chapter, we present Recast, a novel anti-censorship archival system
based on random data entanglement [71]. It exploits erasure codes to generate
redundant blocks combining content from multiple documents, old and new, in
order to protect them from both failures and malicious attacks. As opposed to
prior work, Recast allows efficient recursive repair while requiring censors to
do an increasingly large amount of work over a large number of storage nodes
as the archive scales, which is a highly desirable property.
Recast uses a hybrid strategy for data entanglement designed to offer fast
short-term and strong long-term protection to all the documents in the archive.
This means that entanglement is performed in such a way that documents be-
come more resilient as they stay longer in the system, and the level of interdepen-
dencies makes it quickly impossible to delete or tamper with a single document
without causing collateral damage to a large number of other documents.
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Chapter 8
Convolutional LPDC codes
for distributed storage
systems
8.1 Introduction
The requirements of large-scale distributed storage systems are often ill-suited
to coding techniques developed in other settings. Erasure codes must have small
length to store data objects upon arrival, high code rate to mitigate the storage
overhead and low repair locality to cope with a small number of unavailable
nodes efficiently.
Our contributions We study high rate convolutional LDPC codes of pe-
riod 1 [120] for immutable distributed storage systems. Convolutional LDPC
codes allow efficient local encoding and decoding of data objects using small
constituent codes, while improving the reliability of these constituent codes by
allowing message passing algorithms when local decoding is insufficient. Our
construction sequentially archives data objects, each consisting of a single code-
word. Each data object has s data blocks, is entangled with t ≜ s + p blocks
already archived with which the code generates p parity blocks. Aided by math-
ematical analysis to avoid bad structures, we do an exhaustive search and pro-
vide the best constructions for 1 ≤ s ≤ 5 and p = 2. As an example, optimal
bSTEP(5,2) is more reliable than a rs(20,8) code, with a complexity compa-
rable to that of rs(10,4) codes used by Facebook [121].
State of the art The performance of LDPC codes in the small length regime
has not been ascertained. The finite-length analysis of LDPC codes on the
binary erasure channel (BEC), presented in Section 4.5.3, provides ensemble
results for the error probability together with a combinatorial characterization
of decoding failures via message passing. Although the behaviour of individual
codes is likely to concentrate around the ensemble average, the performance
evaluation of code instances remains open. Moreover, degree distributions tai-
lored to achieve capacity asymptotically lead to a significant decoding overhead
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factor, when used with small lengths, that is, the number of blocks required
to reconstruct the data is greater than the code dimension, see Section 4.5.1.
Moreover, Reed-Solomon codes outperform LDPC codes in this regime when the
download speed is slow. Small LDPC codes minimizing the decoding overhead
are proposed in [122], but their performance in the presence of erasures is not
analysed. The reliability of low repair bandwidth LDPC codes of length n ≥ 60
is studied in [22], see Section 4.5.2, and an archival storage system based on
Tornado codes of length 96 and rate 1
2
is implemented in [70], see Section 4.5.5.
Ensemble-wise, coupling LDPC codes increases the decoding threshold to
the maximum possible on the BEC [123]. On the AWGN channel, such gain
of convolutional LDPC codes over the underlying LDPC block code is veri-
fied via simulations for n ≥ 145 [124]. Implementation aspects of convolutional
LDPC codes, e.g., systematic encoding and code termination, are discussed
in [125], but besides an instance of length 128, simulations only cover codes with
n ≥ 512. Short to moderate length convolutional LDPC codes based on quasi-
cyclic LDPC codes are built in [126], but again only with three-digit-number
code lengths.
Outline The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In Sections 8.2 and 8.3
we respectively introduce bSTEP(s, p) and define its structure. In Section 8.4
we compute the minimal erasures which we use for the reliability analysis of
Section 8.5. We discuss extensions in Section 8.6 and conclude in Section 8.7.
8.2 Coding scheme: bSTEP(s, p)
We define bSTEP(s, p) to be a binary STeP-archive, see Section 4.6, with s
source blocks, p parity blocks and t ≜ s + p pointer blocks. Let α ≜ (α1, . . . , αt)
such that α1 ≠ 0 and αi < αj for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ t be the entanglement strategy,
and define
M(l) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩` + t if 1 ≤ ` ≤ t` − t if t < ` ≤ 2t . (8.1)
The pointer column 1 ≤ i ≤ t is a αt−i+1-shift of the data or parity column M(i).
Figure 8.1 shows bSTEP(1,2).
Encoding works as follows: each data object is split into s data blocks,
combined with t = s + p pointer blocks (i.e., t blocks already archived) selected
accordingly to M(⋅) and α, and encoded using a binary parity-check matrix H
to generate p parity blocks. The binary entanglement parity-check matrix H
has size p × 2t and minimum distance at least 2, i.e., no column of H is the
zero column, see Proposition 2.2. The s source blocks and p parity blocks are
then archived on the physical medium. The archive also includes a bootstrap-
ping block (such as an all-zero block, not shown in Figure 8.1) for early blocks
pointing before the beginning of the archive. Note that the choice of M(⋅) is
not restrictive as changing M(⋅) corresponds to a permutation of the columns
of H, as long as one pointer column maps to one source or parity column.
The scheme is systematic, thus data objects can be simply read from a fresh
archive. To decode bSTEP(s, p) in the presence of erasures, we can lever-
age the reconstruction algorithm proposed in [71] and summarised in Section
4.6.1, which coincides with message passing in our binary setting. The recursive
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654321
… …
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di ↵3
di ↵2
di ↵1
di
di+1
pointer
blocks
data
blocks
parity
blocks
Archive
Figure 8.1: In bSTEP(1,2), Column 1 is a α1-shift of Column 4 (M(1) = 4
or equivalently M(4) = 1), Column 2 is a α2-shift of Column 5 (M(2) = 5)
and Column 3 is a α3-shift of Column 6 (M(3) = 6). Each line in the figure
represents the codeword corresponding to a data object.
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di di+↵j
SiM(t j+1)
M(t  j + 1) t  j + 1
Figure 8.2: Two data objects of indices i and i + αj share a block SiM(t−j−1)
which is at coordinate M(t− j + 1), t− j + 1 in the codeword encoding the data
object di, di+αj respectively.
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M(t  j + 1) t  j + 1
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t  j + 1
M(t  `+ 1) t  `+ 1
(a) Size 4.
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M(t  j + 1)
di+↵j
t  j + 1
M(t  `+ 1)
di+↵`
t  `+ 1
t  j + 1
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M(t  j + 1)
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t  q + 1
di+↵`+↵j
M(t  q + 1)
M(t  q + 1)
t  q + 1 t  `+ 1
M(t  `+ 1)
(b) Size 6.
Figure 8.3: Cycle inducing a minimal erasure.
reconstruction starts at the length-2t codeword level and enhances the repair ca-
pability of H thanks to the entanglement. Thus, the reliability of bSTEP(s, p)
depends on the choice of H and α, which we analyse in the next section, where
we make extensive use of the fact that single erasures are repairable by H.
8.3 Selection of H and α
A set of erasures is a set of erased symbols, an erasure pattern is a set of erasures
that result in some data loss, and a minimal erasure is an erasure pattern for
which every erasure is necessary and sufficient for it to be an erasure pattern,
see Section 3.4.4. Furthermore, in our setting:
• An intrinsic erasure pattern is caused by the choice ofH, thus independent
of the entanglement strategy α;
• An incidental erasure pattern is due to the particular entanglement strat-
egy α.
We therefore impose conditions on H to get rid of small intrinsic erasure pat-
terns, and remove incidental erasure patterns by stretching α. We now describe
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Figure 8.4: 3 erasures in a data object cause the size of the minimal erasure to
be at least 7.
our strategy in more details.
Let B be the set of blocks forming a minimal erasure, and let G(B) be the
graph whose set of edges is B and whose vertices are the data objects hosting
blocks in B. Let C be any cycle in G(B). We fix an orientation for C and we
define the length of edge e from data object di1 to data object di2 as ∣e∣ = i2− i1,
possibly negative. Let Ei be the set of edges of C of length ±αi for 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
Lemma 2. The minimal erasure B is intrinsic if and only if, for every cycle C
in G(B), ∣Ei∣ ≡ 0 (mod 2) and ∑
e∈Ei ∣e∣ = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
We now derive conditions for small intrinsic erasure patterns to occur. We
will later avoid these conditions in our search for the best parity-check matrices.
Let 1 ≤ c1, c2 ≤ 2t be distinct coordinates of a codeword from H. We say that
the pair [c1, c2] is a minimal erasure for H when the blocks in position c1 and
c2 cannot be reconstructed simultaneously by H.
Lemma 3. An intrinsic minimal erasure of size 4 can only consist of a cycle
of size 4, see Figure 8.3(a).
Lemma 4. An intrinsic minimal erasure of size 6 can only consist of a cycle
of size 6, see Figure 8.3(b).
Lemma 5. Minimal erasures of size 3 and 5 are not intrinsic.
Proof of Lemma 3. Block SiM(t−j+1), see Figure 8.2, is:
• in coordinate M(t − j + 1) on data object of index i,
• in coordinate t − j + 1 on data object of index i + αj .
A minimal erasure of size 4 spans 4 data objects (3 data objects do not share 4
pairs, and on 5 data objects a minimal erasure comprises at least 5 blocks). Such
data objects are i, i+αj , i+α`, i+αj +α` for a starting point i and 1 ≤ j < ` ≤ t.
The set of erasures forms a minimal pattern if and only if H can repair none of
the following pairs [t− `+1, t− j +1] at di+αj+α` , [M(t− `+1), t− j +1] at di+αj ,[t − ` + 1,M(t − j + 1)] at di+α` , and [M(t − ` + 1),M(t − j + 1)] at di.
Proof of Lemma 4. If a minimal erasure involves three erased blocks in a data
object, then its size is at least 7, as we now show. Let us call i the index of
the data object having 3 erased blocks. As α` ≠ αj for all 1 ≤ `, j ≤ t, ` ≠ j, the
three blocks point to three different data objects, say, i+αj1 , i+αj2 , i+αj3 , see
Figure 8.4. If α is chosen properly, the three data objects i+αj1 , i+αj2 , i+αj3
do not share any block. Data objects i+αj1 and i+αj2 both share a (different)
block with data object i+αj1 +αj2 . Data objects i+αj1 and i+αj3 both share
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a (different) block with data object i+αj1 +αj3 . Data objects i+αj2 and i+αj3
both share a (different) block with data object i+αj2 +αj3 . We need to involve
at least two out of the three data objects of indices i + αj1 + αj2 , i + αj1 + αj3 ,
i+αj2 +αj3 to have each vertex in the graph of degree at least 2. This leads to
at least 7 blocks in the set of erasures.
As a consequence, a minimal erasure of size strictly smaller than 7 corre-
sponds to a cycle.
Proof of Lemma 5. The cycles of size 3 and 5 are a triangle and a pentagon
respectively. They are not intrinsic from Lemma 2.
8.4 Minimal erasures
To compute the size and multiplicity of the smallest minimal erasures of our
bSTEP(s, p) scheme, we implement the Stopping Set Enumeration (SSE) algo-
rithm [35]. We fix an arbitrary entanglement strategy α = (α1, . . . , αt) as well as
a parameter τ corresponding to the largest size of the smallest minimal erasures
we expect to reach.
Let Ip be the p × p identity matrix. We test all the possible matrices H =(h1⋯h2t−2 Ip) with no minimal erasures of size 4. By carefully choosing the
condition that guarantees that the cycle corresponding to a minimal erasure of
size 4 (see Figure 8.3(a)) is disconnected, we simultaneously avoid some minimal
erasures of size 6 (see Figure 8.3(b)). For each of the resulting matrices we run
the SSE algorithm and compute the multiplicity nHi of the smallest intrinsic
minimal erasure of size 1 ≤ i ≤ τ . Let σH be the smallest minimal erasure for
bSTEP(s, p) entangled with H, i.e., nHi = 0 for all 1 ≤ i < σH and nHσH ≥ 1.
We of course want the smallest minimal erasure to be large and to have low
multiplicity. Hence, we select H with the minimal erasure of size σ = max
H
σH
occurring with multiplicity nσ = minH nHσ . Possibly after adjusting α, these
matrices provide the best possible bSTEP(s, p) in terms of the size σ of the
smallest minimal erasure and its multiplicity nσ.
8.4.1 Results
We search for the best bSTEP(s, p) codes for p = 2 and 1 ≤ s ≤ 5. The results
are summarised in Table 8.1. We report the storage overhead, the size of the
smallest minimal erasure σ and its multiplicity nσ. We also report the number
#H of parity-check matrices achieving the best pair σ, nσ for a suitable α, and
the smallest right degree (of the corresponding Tanner graph) of the optimal
solutions. Table 8.1 also includes the smallest entanglement strategy and a
parity-check matrix, not necessarily unique, achieving the best construction.
For bSTEP(1,2) there is only one matrix reaching σ = 12 and nσ = 1. For
bSTEP(2,2) we find eight matrices reaching σ = 10 and nσ = 1. Out of those,
four matrices have right degree 5 (for efficiency in repairing single erasures the
lower the better). For bSTEP(3,2) we find 12 matrices reaching σ = 10 and
nσ = 2, all having half check nodes of degree 6 and half of degree 7. For
bSTEP(4,2) we find 72 matrices reaching σ = 9 and nσ = 2, having check nodes
degree 7 or 8. For bSTEP(5,2) we find 216 matrices reaching σ = 8 and nσ = 6,
having check nodes degree 9 or 10. Among them 96 have σ = 8, nσ = 6 and r = 9.
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Storage overhead s α r σ nσ #H H
200% 1 (1,5,6) 4 12 1 1 (1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1
)
100% 2 (1,4,6,11) 5 10 1 8 (1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
)
67% 3 (1,4,6,11,19) 7* 10 2 12 (1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
)
50% 4 (1,4,10,17,29,53) 8* 9 2 72 (1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
)
40% 5 (1,4,10,17,24,43,79) 9 8 6 96 (0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
)
Table 8.1: Best constructions for bSTEP(s,2) with 1 ≤ s ≤ 5. We optimise for the size of the smallest minimal erasure σ and its
multiplicity nσ. We indicate with * right-irregular codes.
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8.5 Reliability
8.5.1 Markov model
We can study the reliability of coding schemes for storage systems using Markov
models, see Chapter 3. For the centrality of the reliability evaluation in this
chapter, we recall the key features of the model.
A Markov model is characterized by mean time to failure (mttf), or equiva-
lently drive failure rate λ = 1mttf , and mean time to repair (mttr), or equivalently
drive rebuild rate µ = 1mttr . The rebuild rate µ from state i + 1 to state i is de-
termined by the recovery rate of a single block as we assume that the recovery
does not depend on the total number of available chunks [39]. The transition
rate σi from state i to state i + 1 is σi = (n − i)λpi, where pi is the probability
that the code can withstand one more node failure, given that it has already
tolerated i failures. We compute such a conditional probability as pi = r(i+1)r(i)
where r(i) is the fraction of repairable patterns of size i [42]. For non-MDS
codes, we might go from state i directly to the DL state. We represent this with
the probabilities δi = (n − i)λ(1 − pi).
Using the Markov model, we can compute the mean time to data loss
(MTTDL) of a representative codeword by solving a linear system. Then, the
MTTDL of a large system is obtained by dividing the MTTDL of a codeword
by the number of codewords [42]. For bSTEP(s, p), however, we must esti-
mate the system-wide MTTDL directly since the archive consists of a unique
convolutional codeword, as we explain next.
8.5.2 Approximation for r(i)
For a MDS code of length n and dimension k we have r(i) = 1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − k
and r(i) = 0 for n − k < i ≤ n. Since bSTEP(s, p) archives are not MDS, the
number of repairable patterns of size ranging from the minimum distance to the
maximal fault tolerance is strictly bigger than 0 and strictly smaller than 1. To
compute such numbers we resort to an approximation based on the idea that
the smallest minimal erasures are dominant.
Let SD be the set of fully entangled blocks when the archive holds D data
objects. Let σ be the size of the smallest minimal erasure and β ≥ σ,B ≤∣SD ∣. Let ND(β,B) be the number of erasure patterns of size B ≥ β coming
from minimal erasures of size β when the archive holds D data objects. ThenND(β,β) is the number of minimal erasures of size β at D data objects andND(β,β) = nβ ⋅D. The fraction of repairable patterns of size β is
r(β) = 1 −
β∑
i=σND(i, β)(∣SD ∣
β
) = 1 −
ND(σ,β) + β∑
i=σ+1ND(i, β)(∣SD ∣
β
) .
Like staircase codes, for which the dominant contribution to the error floor is
due to minimal stall patterns [127], we can show that minimal erasures of size
σ are dominant, i.e.,
r(β) ≈ 1 − ND(σ,β)(∣SD ∣
β
)
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3-repl Triple replication [121]
rs(10,4) Reed-Solomon code of dimension 10 and length 14
used in HDFS-RAID at Facebook
[121]
rs(6,3) Reed-Solomon code of dimension 6 and length 9 used
in GFS II at Google
[39]
was(6,4) LRC of dimension 6 with 2 local and 2 global parities
for Windows Azure Storage (WAS)
[41]
xorbas(10,6) LRC of dimension 10 with 4 RS parities and 2 local
parities implemented in HDFS-Xorbas
[40]
Table 8.2: State-of-the-art-codes used for comparison.
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Figure 8.5: System MTTDL. On the x-axis we report the number of (fully
entangled) blocks in the system. We refer to Table 8.2 for state-of-the-art erasure
codes and indicate xorbas(10,6) simply as xorbas.
and that duplicates (non-minimal erasure patterns arising from different mini-
mal erasures) are negligible, i.e,
r(β) ≈ 1 − ND(σ,σ)(∣SD ∣−σβ−σ )(∣SD ∣
β
) = nσ ⋅D(
∣SD ∣−σ
β−σ )(∣SD ∣
β
) . (8.2)
Knowing the size of smallest minimal erasure σ and its multiplicity nσ provides
us with an approximation for r(β) capturing the correct order of magnitude for
the number of erasure patterns of size β, thus leading to an accurate estimate
of r(β) for σ ≤ β ≤ ∣SD ∣.
8.5.3 Comparison between bSTEP(s, p) and other codes
We can build bSTEP(s, p) for any value of s and p greater than 1. As usual,
greater fragmentation increases encoding and decoding complexity, however the
increase is higher for bSTEP(s, p) than for a standard linear codes of dimension
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s and redundancy p, as increasing s and p leads to a code of length s + p + t =
2s+ 2p. Nevertheless, bSTEP(s, p) is a light XOR-based scheme, not requiring
finite field arithmetic. Furthermore, in order to maximize the reliability for a
fixed bSTEP(s, p), we need to stretch α, which impacts the tail of not-fully-
entangled blocks at the end of the archive, see Section 8.6. For bSTEP(s,2)
the repair locality is r ≥ s + 2, as we use an entanglement parity-check matrix
H with 2s+ 2p nonzero columns. The schemes detailed in Section 8.4.1 achieve
the best σ and nσ, but their repair locality increases with s.
With these tradeoffs in mind, we compare the MTTDL of bSTEP(s,2)
against state-of-the-art erasure codes, summarised in Table 8.2, using the Markov
model parameters from [40]. The results are presented in Figure 8.5. The mean
time to failure of a disk mttf = 1
λ
is set at 4 years. For the 3-replication scheme,
the block repair rate equals the cross-rack communication bandwidth over block
size 1Gbps
256MB in [40], leading to a mttr of 2 seconds. We assume that all the codes
repair at this rate, ignoring for example the effect of using heavy or light de-
coders. Nevertheless, the respective reliability order of the coding schemes meets
the results in [40, 41].1
While we do not consider the numbers from Figure 8.5 valuable by them-
selves, see Section 3.4, we use them to compare the reliability of bSTEP(s,2)
with respect to equivalent storage overhead schemes. In particular, at a 66%
storage overhead, bSTEP(3,2) has the same reliability than a Reed-Solomon
rs(15,10) code. At a 40% storage overhead, the reliability of bSTEP(5,2) is
comparable to the reliability of rs(20,8), with the local complexity of rs(10,4)
used in HDFS-RAID at Facebook.
8.6 Extensions and Discussion
8.6.1 Protecting the tail with replication
When D data objects are archived in bSTEP(s, p), the first tD−∑ti=1 αi blocks
are fully entangled, which leaves a tail of ∑ti=1 αi blocks that do not fully benefit
from the protection of entanglement. In turn, minimal erasures of size smaller
than σ comprising blocks from the tail arise. For example, for bSTEP(5,2) as
in Table 8.1, the tail amounts to 178 blocks. We can secure these recent blocks
by properly replicating them until they are fully entangled. Since the size of the
tail is constant, the overhead cost of these additional replicas becomes negligible
as the archive grows.
8.6.2 Increasing the number of pointers: bSTEP(s, p, t)
In this work, we set t = s+p. We can increase the fault tolerance of bSTEP(s, p)
by relaxing this hypothesis and choosing t > s+p. Increasing t rises the complex-
ity of encoding and decoding, increases the repair locality of the code, enlarges
the tail of the archive, and complicates the selection of H and α by breaking the
symmetry. However, the gain in fault tolerance can be significant. For example
consider bSTEP(2,2), which has a single minimal erasure of size 10.
1The increasing reliability order is 3-repl followed by rs(6,3) and was(6,4) in [41], and
3-repl followed by rs(10,4) and xorbas(10,6) in [40].
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By increasing t from 4 to 5, the scheme loses its symmetry, and we cannot en-
tangle columns as prescribed byM(⋅) in Equation (8.1). However, if we write sji
(pji ) for the i-th source (parity) block of the j-th data object, and if we entangle
the columns as si−α51 si−α41 si−α32 pi−α21 pi−α12 si1 si2 pi1 pi2, choosing
H = (1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
) and α = (1,7,13,49,81), we can increase
the size of the smallest minimal erasure from 10 to 14 (and multiplicity 1).
8.7 Summary
In this chapter, we focus on LDPC codes for distributed storage applications.
As opposed to most work on these codes, we target small block lengths, for
which the asymptotic results do not apply. Combining binary linear codes and
data entanglement, we build convolutional LDPC codes that enable on-the-fly
encoding of s ≥ 1 source blocks. The LDPC structure also allows fast repair
of a large number of erasures via message passing. We study and characterize
minimal erasures to determine the best schemes in terms of erasure correction.
Our Markov analysis reveals that, for the same storage overhead, state-of-the-
art erasure codes require more fragmentation to attain the same reliability as
our scheme.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
In this thesis, we consider several aspects of erasure coding for distributed stor-
age systems. In what follows, we summarise our contributions and recap open
problems together with the related future work.
Summary of contributions We first introduce the mathematical founda-
tions of coding theory and present state-of-the-art coding techniques for dis-
tributed environments. The objective of these methods is to cope with failures
so that stored content can be reliably retrieved from a network of individually
unreliable nodes. For years the trend has been to privilege methods offering an
optimal tradeoff between fault tolerance and storage overhead, but more recent
techniques are tailored to optimize maintenance-oriented metrics. In particular,
we quantify the impact of the repair locality on the bandwidth consumption
for repair operations as well as on the overall reliability. We show that, as op-
posed to information locality, all-blocks repair locality can substantially decrease
the bandwidth utilisation during repair. We also tackle the problem of block
placement in fault-tolerant distributed systems. For reliability purposes, one is
tempted to spread codeword blocks far from each other, on units unlikely to fail
simultaneously. However, the more we disperse the blocks, the greater is the
fetch latency to retrieve them. We evaluate several block placement heuristics
taking into account different network topologies, targeting fast write/read of
data object to/from the nodes comprising the systems, while ensuring fault tol-
erance. We dedicate the last two chapters of the thesis to the enrichment of the
above coding techniques via data entanglement. In particular, we demonstrate
that the combination of random data entanglement together with erasure coding
provides anti-censorship properties to the system, and that structured entan-
glement combined with binary linear codes produces strongly reliable schemes.
Perspectives The work about entanglement calls for new challenges. Re-
cast, i.e., the system implementing random entanglement on top of erasure
coding, exposes the metadata server as a single point of failure. Indeed, while
it is very difficult to remove a single document thanks to data entanglement, if
the metadata is damaged, the system is unable to identify and locate entangled
blocks making reconstruction operations impossible. Thus, for Recast to be
a practical system, metadata must also be protected. This is currently being
addressed by the systems team in Neuchâtel who recently submitted a solution
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for the problem using Ethereum smart contracts. We could also use alternative
coding techniques together with random entanglement. For example, the MDS
erasure code can be replaced by a locally repairable code to improve the local
repair performance and cope with single failures more efficiently.
An open challenge regarding structured entanglement on top of binary lin-
ear block codes is the study of how much the reliability can be improved by
relaxing the hypothesis on the number of pointers t, i.e., to have t > s+p entan-
gled blocks per codeword. The approach rises many costs (it increases encoding
and decoding complexity as well as the repair locality, it enlarges the tail of
the archive, and it complicates the selection of the entanglement structure by
breaking the symmetry) but can greatly enlarge the smallest minimal erasure,
as we demonstrated. Moreover, because entanglement needs time to kick in, we
proposed to replicate blocks belonging to the tail of not-fully-entangled docu-
ments. It remains an open problem to set an appropriate level of replication for
such blocks, as well as to determine the real impact of the tail on the overall
reliability. We envision a prototype implementation demonstrating that the on-
the-fly encoding performance is competitive with respect to standard erasure
codes and that reconstruction by message passing endows our scheme with a
reconstruction efficiency comparable to that offered by long LDPC codes.
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